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The purpose of this paper is twofold: firstly, to identify and quantify the potential costs to the 
Czech economy should fulfilment of the Maastricht inflation criterion (MIC) require 
disinflation; and secondly, to discuss and suggest policies geared towards minimising the costs 
related to meeting the MIC. We assume that the real appreciation of the koruna will be about 
1.5% during the reference period. Three disinflation simulations are derived from this 
assumption. The results show that a decline in inflation by 0.5 p.p., 1 p.p. and 1.5 p.p. leads to a 
cumulative loss of output reaching about 0.5%, 1% and 1.6% respectively of annual potential 
GDP over a period of four years. The time restriction imposed on the simulations implies that 
the shorter the time to reach a given lower level of inflation, the higher the initial increase in the 
interest rate and the more aggressive the policy rule needed. The simulation results and the 
likely application of the monetary convergence criteria are relevant to the discussion of policy 
options. We argue that due to the asymmetry of the Maastricht exchange rate criterion (MERC), 
allowing for nominal appreciation rather than depreciation, fulfilment of the MIC should be 
superior. Also, we suggest that the main task for the CNB will be to focus on reaching a level of 
inflation consistent with the presumed level of the MIC sufficiently early before the reference 
period. This may require a downward adjustment of the CNB’s inflation point target and an 
extension of the current policy horizon.  
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1. Introduction  
In comparison with the majority of the new EU countries, inflation in the Czech Republic (CR) is 
relatively low and will presumably stay so in the foreseeable future. Consequently, the fulfilment 
of the Maastricht inflation criterion (MIC) at some more or less distant future time is not 
considered an issue either domestically or internationally. We challenge this and present some 
arguments suggesting that meeting the MIC may not be that easy.  
It is well documented that the new EU countries are enjoying fast real appreciation of their 
currencies. However, high real appreciation may drive their inflation above the average EMU 
inflation and possibly even above the level consistent with the MIC. This is evidenced by existing 
inflation patterns in the EMU: the countries with the highest levels of inflation are typically those 
which are catching up towards the EMU average. If most of the less advanced countries have 
higher inflation than the more advanced ones, why should the new EU countries not follow suit? 
Is it so unrealistic to assume that in the medium run Czech inflation will reach the level that 
prevails in the less advanced EMU economies and will tend to fluctuate around that level? Should 
this prove to be the case, fulfilment of the MIC may be more difficult than is often argued. 
Therefore, we find it useful to deepen the knowledge of the potential costs of meeting the MIC 
and to better understand the policy options which policy-makers are likely to face before adopting 
the euro.  
The above questions set the stage for our paper. It focuses both on positive analysis and on 
normative policy advice. Specifically, we attempt to:  
-  identify the factors that are likely to determine inflation in the CR in the medium term, 
-  form plausible assumptions about the possible extent of these factors and thereby quantify the 
difference between the expected level of inflation in the CR and the MIC, 
-  simulate the costs of potential disinflation and the impact of some inflation shocks, 
-  discuss the available policy options geared towards minimising the costs of meeting the MIC.  
 
Several points deserve to be stressed:  
Firstly, the very idea of the CR joining the EMU is not questioned here. The readiness of the 
country to benefit from using the euro over the long run is investigated by the growing optimum 
currency area-based literature. Recently, it has become the focus of regular yearly assessments 
carried out jointly by the Ministry of Finance and the CNB. Most of the euro-related studies thus 
examine the costs and benefits of having the euro. Instead, we investigate potential costs of 
adopting the euro when fulfilling the MIC, irrespective of the costs and benefits of using the euro 
thereafter. In other words, we study how the Czech economy could temporarily reach the required 
nominal monetary convergence in the least costly way.  
Secondly, since the adoption of inflation targeting in the CR in 1998, decision-makers have 
focused mainly on seeking such a path of interest rates which could enable the existing inflation 
targets to be attained. The monetary policy costs (in terms of output loss) usually have not played 
the dominant role and have been of secondary importance in the decision-making. The innovation 
of this paper is that the modelling framework of the CNB (used for forecasting inflation) is 
applied to quantify the costs that may be incurred by the potentially needed disinflation. The Fulfilment of the Maastricht Inflation Criterion by the Czech Republic   3 
 
results of our simulations are relevant to the discussion of the policy options available in the 
period before the adoption of the euro.  
Thirdly, the Maastricht fiscal criteria are beyond the attention of this paper. Their fulfilment is 
taken for granted and no conflict between them and the monetary criteria is envisaged. For the 
sake of simplicity, fiscal policy also remains outside the framework of our analysis, except for one 
simulation that quantifies the impact of a fiscal policy shock on inflation.  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present evidence on the inflation differentials 
of the EU-15 economies vis-à-vis the level of the MIC during 1999–2004. In Section 3, we 
investigate three groups of factors which could potentially complicate the fulfilment of the MIC. 
Initially, we focus on level factors that are supposed to persist over the long term and that are 
likely to keep inflation above the expected level of the MIC on a sustained basis. Then we discuss 
cyclical factors that lie behind the volatility of inflation over the business cycle. Also, we deal 
with shocks and explain some of the reasons why the sensitivity of inflation to shocks could be 
higher in the new EU countries than in the EMU. Finally, we make assumptions about the 
expected size of the level factors in the years to come. In Section 4, we define two loss functions 
in order to quantify the cost of disinflation and to discriminate between various disinflation 
scenarios. We justify the policy assumptions of the disinflation shocks and present the results of 
the simulations of the level factors and of five inflation shocks. In Section 5, we focus on the very 
Maastricht criteria against which the monetary performance will be assessed. We discuss the 
possible application of the MIC and the Maastricht exchange rate criterion (MERC) and derive the 
implications for the policy options. These are the subject of Section 6. We introduce three kinds of 
fulfilment of the MIC, which we call “hard fulfilment”, “soft fulfilment” and “cheap fulfilment”. 
We define “flexible” and “fixed” approaches towards the adoption of the euro. We organise the 
discussion of the available policy options around several key questions and sum it up in the 
simplified form of a decision-making tree. We formulate some advice for the decision-making 
framework of the CNB. Section 7 summarises and outlines topics for further research.  
2. Inflation in the EU-15 during 1999–2004: Empirical Evidence  
Below, we look briefly at the inflation patterns in the EU-15. They display several features that 
serve as a point of departure for this paper. Table 1 shows the differentials between inflation in 
each country and the MIC during 1999–2004.  
The comparison of HICP inflation in the EU-15 countries relative to the level of the MIC leads us 
to the following observations. Firstly, we can identify three groups of countries: those with 
relatively high average negative differentials vis-à-vis the MIC (such as Germany, France, 
Austria, Finland, the United Kingdom and Sweden), those with moderate average negative 
differentials (such as Italy, Luxembourg and Denmark) and those with positive average 
differentials (such as Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal). Secondly, the last two columns of the 
table show how many times in the given years each country “missed” the hypothetical MIC and 
how many times in the given years inflation would have constituted the basis for computation of 
the MIC. Again, we can identify three groups of countries: those whose inflation performance 
(during the given period) always satisfied the MIC (such as Belgium, Germany, Austria, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom and Denmark), those whose inflation performance (on a calendar year basis) 4   Vít Bárta  
 
never served as the basis for computation of the MIC (such as Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal) and those whose inflation sometimes missed the MIC 
but in other years served as the basis for computation of the MIC (such as France and Finland).  
Table 1: Inflation differentials vis-à-vis the MIC during 1999–2004  







EU-15  -0.9 -0.8 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.2  -0.6         
EMU  -1.0 -0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.1  -0.6       
Belgium -1.0  0.0  -0.7  -1.3  -1.2 -0.3  -0.7  0  1 
Germany  -1.5 -1.3 -1.2 -1.6 -1.7 -0.4 -1.3  0  5 
Greece 0.0  0.2 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.8  0.6  5  0 
Spain  0.1 0.8 -0.3  0.7 0.4 0.9  0.4  5  0 
France  -1.5  -0.9  -1.3  -1.0 -0.5 0.1  -0.8  1  2 
Ireland  0.4 2.6 0.9 1.8 1.3 0.1  1.2  6  0 
Italy -0.4  -0.1  -0.8  -0.3  0.1 0.1  -0.2  2  0 
Luxemburg -1.1  1.1  -0.7 -0.8 -0.2 1.0  -0.1  2  0 
Netherlands -0.1  -0.4  2.0 1.0 -0.5 -0.8  0.2 2  0 
Austria  -1.6  -0.7 -0.8 -1.2 -1.4  -0.2 -1.0  0  2 
Portugal  0.1 0.1 1.3 0.8 0.6 0.3  0.5  6  0 
Finland -0.8  0.3  -0.4 -0.9 -1.4 -2.1  -0.9  1  2 
Sweden  -1.5 -1.4 -0.4 -0.9 -0.4 -1.2  -1.0 0  3 
Great Britain  -0.8  -1.9 -1.9 -1.6 -1.3 -0.9  -1.4  0  3 
Denmark 0.0  0.0  -0.8  -0.5  -0.7  -1.3  -0.5 0  1 
Addendum          Average       
MIC  2.1 2.7 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.2  2.6         
Source: Eurostat, author’s computations  
Note 1:  The data show the 12-month moving averages of the HICP on a calendar year basis  
Note 2: Positive values (marked in red) signify higher inflation as compared to the level of the MIC in 
the given year; some of the negative differentials (those marked in blue) mean that the level of 
inflation in the given country in the given year would have served as the basis for computation 
of the MIC.  
 
The above evidence leads us to the following conclusions. On the one hand, we can see a 
relatively narrow set of low inflation countries which have determined the level of the MIC 
(primarily Germany, followed by Sweden and the United Kingdom). On the other hand, we can 
clearly identify a set of countries which typically missed the hypothetical MIC either in all six 
years under consideration (Ireland and Portugal) or in five years (Greece and Spain). Needless to 
say, inflation in all these four countries never served as the basis for computation of the MIC.
1  
                                                           
1 There are two possible methodological objections against the legitimacy of a simple comparison of the inflation 
patterns between the current EMU members and the new EU countries. Firstly, the EMU countries are subject to 
a common monetary policy that is largely exogenous to them and need not respond to their “needs” (interest 
rates may not meet their “needs” both from the level point of view and from the timing point of view). Inflation 
in each particular country after the inception of Stage Three of the EMU may not be a good proxy for the 
inflation they would have had if they had maintained an independent monetary policy. While for low inflation 
countries a given ECB interest rate can still be too tight, for high inflation countries the same level of rates can 
be too loose. The second objection is related to the “locked” exchange rate channel. The real appreciation of less 
advanced EMU countries cannot now materialise through appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, but takes Fulfilment of the Maastricht Inflation Criterion by the Czech Republic   5 
 
The above evidence indicates the existence of common inflation patterns shared by the less 
advanced EU-15 economies (with the possible exception of Ireland) which push up their level of 
inflation persistently above that consistent with the MIC. As the MIC appears to be quite 
demanding for those countries, it may be even more so for the new EU Member States. This leads 
us to the hypothesis that fulfilment of the MIC may turn out to be more challenging for them than 
is generally believed and than is sometimes argued. In other words, should the features which still 
characterise the inflation patterns in the less advanced EU-15 countries persist in the Czech 
Republic over the next four or five years, fulfilment of the MIC may become costly. Another 
difficulty may arise from possibly higher inflation volatility in the Czech economy, either due to 
business cycle effects or due to the higher sensitivity of Czech inflation to external shocks. An 
inspection of the potential costs and a policy-oriented discussion of their minimisation establish 
the mission of this paper. 
3. Possible Patterns of Inflation in the Czech Republic before Adoption of 
the Euro  
When investigating the sources of inflation, Arratibel/Palenzuela/Thimann (2002) found a strong 
influence of the oil price, nominal wage growth and fiscal developments on tradable goods and a 
high impact of wage and fiscal policy, price liberalisation and productivity development on non-
tradable inflation. Also, they identified a continuing high level of inflation inertia in the new EU 
countries. This is consistent with the findings of Hondroyiannis/Lazaretou (2004), who found a 
high persistence of inflation in Greece from 1975 until recently. Backé et al. (2002) studied a 
number of factors driving the price dynamics in the former accession countries, with (i) the 
completion of price deregulation (especially in the energy sector) and the adjustment of 
agricultural prices upon EU membership, (ii) productivity developments, and (iii) wage 
developments in the tradables sector playing the major role. Also, they stressed the paramount 
importance of relative price adjustments in explaining medium-term inflation development. The 
same factor was investigated by Holub/Čihák (2003). They studied the relationship between 
relative price adjustments and price level development, concluding that if inflation is around the 
inflation target, the process of economic adjustment is unlikely to lead to declines in prices. In 
addition to the Balassa–Samuelson effect (BSE), Mihaljek/Klau (2003) identified an important 
impact on inflation in the Czech Republic and Croatia stemming from adjustments in 
administered prices and indirect taxes, imported inflation, and shifts in demand towards non-
tradables brought about by rising real income. On the other hand, in Hungary, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia they found strong price inertia fostered by a boosting of external competitiveness, 
high pass-through of the exchange rate, the dominance of backward-looking expectations, wage 
convergence and inconsistencies between fiscal and monetary policies to be significant. Ådhal 
(2003) found that the deregulation of controlled prices, tax adjustments and the alignment of 
agricultural prices due to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) had the strongest influence on 
inflation in the short run, and that the BSE and shifts in demand for non-tradables are important 
over the long run. Cincibuch/Vávra (2001) pointed to the risks of the rigidity of nominal 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
place rather through inflation differentials. On the other hand, for the euro applicants the channel of nominal 
appreciation is still “open” and the real appreciation may be only partly reflected by the inflation figures. The 
inflation differentials can thus provide a comparison of inflation patterns only when the nominal exchange rate is 
fixed. We are aware of these qualifications, but we disregard them to make our analysis tractable.  6   Vít Bárta  
 
variables, especially nominal wages, for the adjustment of real variables, with negative 
implications for inflation and its persistence.  
The inflation factors are very different in nature and their impact on inflation has varied over time 
depending on the stage of economic transformation and the phase of accession to the EU. 
Currently, some of the factors are relatively modest (deregulation of some administered prices) or 
almost non-existent (price liberalisation of the majority of tradable goods), but other factors may 
still be relevant in the short run (adjustment of food prices due to adoption of the CAP), in the 
medium run (changes in indirect taxes) and in the long run (real appreciation of the currency due 
to productivity differentials).  
In this paper we divide the inflation factors into three groups: level factors, cyclical factors and 
shocks. Discussion of these factors will enable us to formulate quantitative assumptions about the 
likely pattern of future inflation, which will be used in our simulations in Section 4. We collect 
evidence that makes our simulation assumptions realistic and reasonably acceptable.  
3.1 Level Factors  
Level factors are expected to push inflation in the Czech Republic (and the other new EU 
countries) above that in the EMU over the long run, i.e. until real convergence is basically 
achieved.
2 Among the level factors, prominent attention has been directed towards the BSE. 
3.1.1 Balassa–Samuelson Effect  
Much effort has been made to quantify the BSE for old and new EU countries over recent years. 
A study by the ECB (2003) shows that the BSE can be an important cause of inflation 
differentials among EMU economies. It summarised several empirical findings quantifying the 
size of the BSE and compared the implied inflation differentials due to the BSE with the actual 
HICP inflation differentials during 1995–2002 (Figure 1).  
The study finds that inflation is broadly consistent with the estimates of the BSE, although the gap 
between actual inflation in the group of countries with relatively higher inflation (as compared to 
the group of countries with relatively lower inflation) is higher than the BSE estimates would 
imply. The BSE thus cannot be the only explanatory variable for inflation differentials, as the 
examples of Belgium and Finland show. Similarly, actual inflation in the Netherlands requires 
another explanation than that offered by the Balassa–Samuelson framework. The above evidence 
supports the hypothesis that the less advanced EMU economies are converging towards the euro 
area average in terms of price level (economic development) and that some part of this catching-
up may be associated with the BSE.  
 
                                                           
2 We are aware of factors that may act in the opposite direction (i.e. towards lower inflation). These include 
further deregulation and liberalisation of some still regulated markets, which is intended to enhance competition 
and thereby dampen inflation. Presumably these factors will counteract the pro-inflationary pressures.  Fulfilment of the Maastricht Inflation Criterion by the Czech Republic   7 
 
Figure 1: Implied inflation differentials to the euro area average due to the Balassa–




























Source: ECB (2003).  
 
However, the search for the importance of the BSE in the new EU members, including the Czech 
Republic, has been somewhat surprising. Although one would expect quite a significant BSE (due 
to the sizeable GDP per capita gap between the EU-15 and the new EU countries), numerous 
authors have arrived at meagre, if not disappointing, results. Table 2 (taken from Égert et al., 
2004) summarises some of the empirical studies quantifying the contribution of the BSE to 
inflation for the Czech Republic.  
Table 2: Inflation due to the Balassa–Samuelson effect for the Czech Republic  
Author (year)      Inflation (in percentage points)  
Golinelli/Orsi (2001)    4.3  
Sinn/Rutter (2001)    2.9 
Halpern/Wyplosz (2001)  1.2 
Rosati  (2002)    1.2 
Flek et al. (2002)    0.2 
Mihaljek (2002)     0.3 
Kovács et al. (2002)    0.7 
Égert  (2002a)    0.8   
Égert  (2002b)    0.8   
Égert  (2003)    0.4   
Backé et al. (2003)    0.6 
Source: Égert et al. (2004).  
 8   Vít Bárta  
 
The table indicates that the importance of the BSE has been diminishing over time. While the 
earlier research discovered a relatively robust BSE, recent studies suggest a very modest impact of 
productivity differentials on inflation differentials (real appreciation).
3  
There are several possible reasons for the poor evidence for the BSE so far. Firstly, it may be the 
case that the BSE is present in the Czech economy (and in other countries) but due to statistical 
mismeasurement its existence is difficult to prove. The authors of empirical studies typically point 
to such deficiencies (Flek et al., 2002), namely short time series, a lack of disaggregated data, the 
blurred and variable distinction between tradables and non-tradables, etc. Statistical limitations 
may also account for the fact that the size of the BSE differs substantially across the new EU 
countries (Égert et al., 2004), despite the fact that these countries resemble in many respects 
relating to catching-up over the long run.  
Secondly, it can be argued that overall productivity growth is relatively high in the Czech 
economy but materialises outside the Balassa–Samuelson framework. Unfortunately, there is a 
lack of reliable statistical evidence on productivity growth in services. Should this explanation be 
correct, a more significant BSE might start emerging from the data when the productivity growth 
in services slows down. This hypothesis has been suggested, for example, by Flek et al. (2002), 
who said that “the BS mechanism in its standard form works predominantly, if at all, in more 
advanced economies”, where productivity growth in services (unlike in the tradable sector) is 
limited.
4 This conclusion is supported by the above-mentioned study by the ECB (2003), which 
does find evidence for the BSE in less developed EU-15 countries, and also by Égert et al. (2004), 
who survey several studies focusing on the EMU area.  
The modest success of empirical economists in identifying any significant BSE has led many (see 
Flek et al., 2002; Mihaljek/Klau, 2003; Bulíř/Šmídková, 2005) to conclude that a remarkably high 
proportion of the observed real exchange rate appreciation remains unexplained by the BSE. The 
weak explanatory power of the BSE has thus prompted a search for other explanations (see, for 
example, Holub/Čihák, 2003).  
The purpose of the above discussion is to express the suspicion that the empirical evidence for the 
BSE collected to date may serve as a reliable guide for assuming what the level of inflation in the 
Czech economy might be in five years’ time or so. Nevertheless, the failure of the BS framework 
to deliver satisfactory empirical results should not imply that a connection between productivity 
and real appreciation does not exist.  
3.1.2 Real Exchange Rate Appreciation  
Below, we survey the studies focusing on approximating the future equilibrium real exchange rate 
appreciation of the Czech koruna. We expect to obtain some quantitative idea about this crucial 
variable co-determining potential inflation over the medium run.  
                                                           
3 The Czech Republic, together with Slovenia and Slovakia (but unlike Hungary and Poland), is among the 
countries with a smaller BSE (see Mihaljek/Klau, 2003). A rather higher, but still modest, BSE for the Czech 
Republic (amounting to about 1%) was identified by Beneš/Klíma (2001).  
4 Ådhal (2003) argues that the BSE may be weakened by strong productivity gains in services enabled by the 
heavy undercapitalisation of this sector under the period of central planning.  Fulfilment of the Maastricht Inflation Criterion by the Czech Republic   9 
 
Overviews of the methods used to assess the equilibrium exchange rate of the Czech koruna (and 
summaries of the quantitative results) are provided by Babetskii et al. (2004) and 
Komárek/Melecký (2004). These authors applied a wide array of approaches to estimating the 
paths of equilibrium real exchange rates.
5 To list some of the most recent, we refer to the concept 
of the FRER (Šmídková et al., 2002), the macroeconomic balance approach to the determination 
of the equilibrium real exchange rate (Komárek/Melecký, 2004), the concept of the SRER 
(Bulíř/Šmídková, 2005) and the arbitrage-based model decomposing the real exchange rate 
between substitution and pricing-to-markets components (Cincibuch/Podpiera, 2005). But while a 
great number of authors have investigated the equilibrium real exchange rate of the koruna in the 
past, few of them have attempted to deliver real exchange rate appreciation forecasts or 
simulations.
6 Those few studies are mentioned briefly below.  
Šmídková et al. (2002) applies the FRER model and investigates whether real exchange rates are 
in line with economic fundamentals. Her simulations imply quite modest, if any, real appreciation 
pressures in the middle of this decade and leave the question about the pace of equilibrium real 
appreciation at the end of the decade unanswered.  
Integrating the BS model of the equilibrium exchange rate with a model of capital accumulation 
and the demand side of the economy, Holub/Čihák (2003) carry out two simulations. The 
“baseline scenario” in both simulations shows that the converging country should (over a 25-year 
period) achieve a growth differential vis-à-vis the EU of about 2% a year initially, with a 
gradually declining tendency. The implied equilibrium real exchange rate starts from about 1.5–
2.0% a year and declines to below 1% at the end of the 25-year period.  
Bulíř/Šmídková (2005) apply the concept of the sustainable real exchange rate (SRER) and 
simulate the equilibrium real exchange rate for the period 2004–2010. Their simulations imply a 
modest real appreciation until the end of this decade, despite an expected appreciation of the 
sustainable real exchange rate. In other words, the inflation potential stemming from the real 
exchange rate appreciation is relatively small.  
Analyses and forecasts of the real appreciation of the Czech koruna are regularly provided by the 
inflation projection team at the CNB.
7 In its recent forecasts (from 2005), the team maintains that 
the current pace of equilibrium real appreciation is between 2.5% and 3% and that its future pace 
may diminish to 2% in the first half of 2007. This assumption is derived from different analyses 
and reflects a wide consensus within the CNB. We basically adopt this assumption and 
extrapolate it to obtain the likely pace of real appreciation (shortly) before the fulfilment of the 
MIC. This justifies our assumptions applied in the simulations in Section 4. Figure 2 shows the 
history of the real exchange rate of the koruna between 1993 and 2004.  
                                                           
5 The forthcoming preparation for the adoption of the euro has put issues concerning ERM II entry and a 
successful stay in this mechanism at the top of the research agenda in all the new EU countries (see e.g. Čech et 
al., 2005). The recommendation of the ECB (2003) that the choice of the central rate should reflect the best 
possible assessment of the equilibrium exchange rate and that this assessment should be based on a broad range 
of economic indicators underlines the prominence of this topic.  
6 While some of them have carried out only short term forecasts (Komárek/Melecký, 2004), others have left this 
topic for future research (Babetskii/Égert, 2004).  
7 The forecasting framework within the CNB has been described in “The Czech National Bank’s Forecasting and 
Policy Analysis System” (edited by W. Coats, D. Laxton and D. Rose), Czech National Bank, 2003, and outlined 
in the CNB’s regular Inflation Reports.  10   Vít Bárta  
 































Source: CNB.  
3.1.3 Relative GDP/Price Level “Mismatch”: Empirical Evidence  
Below, we look at the empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that the Czech koruna will go 
on appreciating in real terms over the rest of the decade. We have used data from Eurostat on 
GDP per capita in PPS (Purchasing Power Standards)
8 and comparative price levels
9 in selected 
European countries over the period 1995–2003 (see Table 3).
10 
Table 3: Relative GDP per capita and relative price levels in selected countries in 1995 and 
2003 (EU-25 = 100)  
   GDP per capita in PPS  Comparative price levels 
  1995 2003 03-95 1995 2003 03-95 
             
Czech Republic  70.1  68.8 -1.3 41.2 55.2 14.0 
Estonia 35.6  48.5 12.9 42.4 62.2 19.8 
Hungary 49.6  60.5 10.9 44.0 58.0 14.0 
Slovenia 68.5  76.8 8.3 77.1 77.1 0.0 
Ireland 99.3  132.5 33.2 98.9 127.0 28.1 
Germany 119.5  108.1 -11.4 119.6 108.9 -10.7 
Source: Eurostat, author’s computations.  
                                                           
8 Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of economic activity. It is defined as the value of all goods and 
services produced less the value of any goods or services used in their creation. The volume index of GDP per 
capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) is expressed in relation to the European Union (EU-25) average set 
to equal 100. Basic figures are expressed in PPS, i.e. a common currency that eliminates the differences in price 
levels between countries, allowing meaningful volume comparisons of GDP between countries.  
9 Comparative price levels are the ratio between purchasing power parities (PPPs) and the market exchange rate 
for each country. PPPs are currency conversion rates that convert economic indicators expressed in national 
currencies to a common currency called the Purchasing Power Standard (PPS), which equalises the purchasing 
power of different national currencies and thus allows meaningful comparisons.  
10 According to Eurostat, the index, calculated from PPS figures and expressed with respect to EU-25 = 100, is 
intended for cross-country comparisons rather than for temporal comparisons. Our exposition is only 
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The data show that between 1995 and 2003 the GDP level per capita (relative to the EU-25 level) 
increased in Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia by between 8 and 13 percentage points and in Ireland 
by a full 33 percentage points. On the other hand, relative GDP declined by 11 percentage points 
in Germany and by 1 percentage point in the Czech Republic.  
The right-hand part of the table shows that the comparative price level in Germany declined in 
proportion to the decline in relative GDP and the price level in Ireland increased in proportion to 
the increase in relative GDP. Similarly, the price levels increased in Estonia and Hungary, 
although more than proportionately (by 20 percentage points in the former and by 14 percentage 
points in the latter). In Slovenia the comparative price level remained the same in 2003 as in 1995, 
but in the Czech Republic it increased by 14 percentage points. In other words, while the relative 
GDP in the Czech Republic between 1995 and 2003 remained basically unchanged, the relative 
price level increased by a wide margin.  
There is, indeed, no “iron rule” that all countries must be located on the 45º straight line (see, for 
example, Holub/Čihák, 2003, for a detailed discussion) and that any “mismatch” between the two 
variables must disappear quickly should it emerge. Nevertheless, as the examples of Ireland, 
Germany, Hungary and Slovenia show, a certain proportionality between the comparative price 
level and comparative GDP may tend to exist and persist.  
Although we do not aspire to explain fully the relationship between relative GDP levels and 
relative price levels, the empirical evidence may suggest the following. The increase (decrease) in 
relative GDP in Ireland and Hungary (Germany) was accompanied by a roughly proportionate 
increase (decrease) in the relative price level in these countries. The stagnation of the relative 
price level in Slovenia between 1995 and 2003 occurred in spite of an increase in the relative 
GDP level, implying the possible existence of a “correction mechanism” leading to alignment of 
the two relative variables. On the other hand, the relative price level of Estonia seems to be too 
high compared to its relative GDP level, implying the possibility of lower real appreciation 
(inflation potential) in the future. Just the opposite may be implied for the Czech Republic: its 
relative price level seems to be below the level suggested by its relative GDP level, implying 
scope for further real exchange rate appreciation.  
We are far from claiming that the above evidence should “cause” a real appreciation in the Czech 
economy. We just posit that this evidence is consistent with views indicating that some real 
appreciation may still be “in the pipeline”, as suggested in the literature surveyed above, with the 
possible exception of Šmídková et al. (2002) and Bulíř/Šmídková (2005).  
Considering the observed narrowing of the productivity gap vis-à-vis the EU11, high and 
accelerating productivity growth in manufacturing12, steadily improving export performance (see, 
for example, Benáček et al., 2003) and ongoing microeconomic restructuring of the economy, 
often driven by large inflows of FDI, we conclude that the Czech Republic has embarked on a 
sustainable growth path that outpaces the average EU-15 growth.13 Although the growth of the 
Czech economy may not be currently as high as that of some of the less advanced new EU 
                                                           
11 Relative productivity per person employed (EU-25 = 100) increased from 57.7% in 1995 to 62% in 2003, and 
according to a Eurostat forecast it may reach 66.4% in 2006.  
12 Labour productivity in manufacturing increased from 5–6% during 2002–2003 to above 10% in 2004. 
13 The CNB assumes that the growth of potential output will be between 3% and 3.5% over the next few years.  12   Vít Bárta  
 
members (such as the Baltic countries), its catching-up is likely to be associated with a non-
negligible real exchange rate appreciation.  
Most of the literature surveyed above supports the view that the real appreciation may be 1.5% 
over the next five years or so (when the Czech Republic’s readiness for adopting the euro will 
probably be examined). This assumption is consistent with the relative price level of the Czech 
Republic (vis-à-vis the EU-25 average), which is somewhat below the level implied by relative 
GDP per capita. We believe that we have enough evidence suggesting non-negligible inflation 
potential in the Czech Republic over the medium run.14  
3.2 Cyclical Factors 
Under certain circumstances, the fulfilment of the MIC may be complicated by cyclical factors. 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of Czech inflation as measured by the HICP and of the MIC since 
the inception of the EMU.  







































Source: Eurostat, author’s computation.  
Note: The MIC is computed on the basis of the EU-15 until April 2004 and the EU-25 until July 2005 
(the negative inflation values in Lithuania during May–August 2004 are excluded).  
 
Figure 3 shows that the volatility of Czech inflation was substantially higher than that of the MIC. 
Hypothetically, had the Czech Republic applied to adopt the euro, it would have failed to pass the 
inflation test during 2001 and most of 2002, but would have passed during 2003 and most of 
                                                           
14 Although Ådhal (2003) does not focus exclusively on the Czech Republic, he suggests that in the ten new EU 
countries the accumulated impact of price deregulation, CAP price convergence and tax adjustments may 
account for an annual increase in inflation of between 0.5 and 2 percentage points in the first years following EU 
entry. Allowing for the BS effect, overall inflation could be very roughly 1–3 percentage points above inflation 
in the euro area.  
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2004. The evolution of inflation in the CR and the reasons for its volatility have been described in 
detail in the Inflation Reports of the CNB. The past evidence clearly suggests that Czech inflation 
fluctuated due to a combination of cyclical factors, administrative measures (increases in 
regulated prices and indirect taxes) and shocks. We discuss below the cyclical factors and their 
implications for the future patterns of inflation.  
3.2.1 Higher Volatility of Inflation  
Cyclical factors are related to the evolution of the output gap and its varying impact on inflation at 
different stages of the business cycle. Under normal circumstances, inflationary pressures increase 
during booms and diminish during recessions. Figure 4 reflects this pattern for the Czech 
Republic. It juxtaposes the output gap (measured by three different methods) with narrow 
inflation defined as the CPI excluding food, fuel, regulated prices and indirect taxes, i.e. items 
which are less influenced by the cycle.  
The evidence indicates the relatively high volatility of “narrow” inflation over the cycle 
during the given period. Although the decline in inflation at the end of 2001 and during the 
first half of 2002 was partly due to the strong appreciation of the Czech koruna, the cyclical 
pattern of Czech inflation over the last six years remains obvious.  
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Source: Czech National Bank. 
 
There is hardly any strong theoretical argument suggesting that the inflation volatility in the new 
EU countries should be higher than that in the old countries. Nevertheless, two reasons can be 
mentioned. Firstly, the newly-formed market economies are not yet as settled as their more 
advanced counterparts in the EU. The post-transformation period may still generate vibrations 
uncommon in a stabilised market environment. Süppel (2003) finds that the Central European new 
Member States are growing faster than the EU-15 countries and are subject to wider cyclical 
fluctuations. The higher amplitudes of output are due to the fact that the investment-to-GDP ratios 14   Vít Bárta  
 
in the majority of the new EU economies are still well above those in the more advanced EU 
economies. As capital spending is typically more volatile than non-investment components, the 
business cycle in the new EU economies implies higher output volatility and, indeed, higher 
inflation volatility. Secondly, the fact that the rates of inflation in the new Member States tend to 
be somewhat higher than in the EMU implies possibly higher fluctuations in inflation. This is in 
conformity with the empirical evidence accumulated across countries over an extended period of 
time. Thirdly, we believe that the different inflation or disinflation shocks impacting on the new 
EU economies in the past have exacerbated the cyclical volatility of their inflation. As shocks are 
a different issue, we deal with them separately.  
3.2.2 Phase Difference  
The second cycle-related reason for the mismatch in inflation patterns between the new EU 
countries and the EMU countries may stem from imperfect synchronisation of their business 
cycles. The lack of cyclical synchronisation implies that a country may be disqualified from 
meeting the MIC even if its average inflation complies with the MIC over an extended period. 
Needless to say, this works both ways. It could be just this phase difference which enables the 
given country to meet the MIC even if its average inflation is somewhat higher (but “sufficiently” 
volatile) than the MIC basis over the long run.  
The empirical evidence on the synchronisation of the Czech cycle with the cycle of its main 
trading partners is fairly inconclusive. On the one hand, it is a common experience that domestic 
economic activity is strongly influenced by German import demand (see also the CNB’s Inflation 
Reports). On the other hand, some modelling techniques (based on correlation analysis and on 
VAR models) do not yet confirm a closer synchronisation of the Czech cycle with the euro area 
cycle. As the Ministry of Finance (2005) recently stated, the cyclical alignment of the Czech 
economy with the euro area did not increase during 1995–2003. Specifically, while the occurrence 
of demand shocks converged with the euro area, the differences in supply shocks widened (see 
also Babetskii, 2004). In addition, the ministry argues that the structural differences between the 
Czech economy and the euro area have recently been widening slightly.  
It is not easy to summarise the progress with cyclical synchronisation between the Czech 
economy and the euro area. The ensuing uncertainty leads us to the tentative conclusion that some 
risks of imperfect synchronisation still exist and may persist in the foreseeable future.
15 However, 
we believe that these risks will diminish over the medium run.  
3.3 Shocks  
Shocks are substantial determinants of inflation. Their impact depends on dozens of features 
which may vary over time and which are conditioned by the structural characteristics of the 
economy. For example, the prominent factors of external exposure include the degree of oil 
dependency, the degree of openness towards foreign trading partners, the geographical trade 
structure, and the commodity composition of imports (see ECB, 2003). But this is only a fraction 
of a much larger set of characteristics that matter. The question that policy-makers usually ask is 
                                                           
15 Numerous aspects of the nominal, real, structural and institutional convergence of the former accession 
countries to the euro area are comprehensively discussed by Backé/Thimann (2004).  Fulfilment of the Maastricht Inflation Criterion by the Czech Republic   15 
 
what quantitative impact a particular shock can have on domestic inflation and what policies 
should be adopted to minimise the costs to the economy.  
However, when considering the costs of meeting the MIC, we ask a modified question, namely 
how a given shock can increase domestic inflation as compared to inflation abroad (which serves 
as the basis for computation of the MIC). In other words, we are interested in identifying the 
impacts of asymmetric shocks on the ability to meet the MIC. We briefly discuss several points 
suggesting that inflation in the new EU countries may be more sensitive to shocks than inflation in 
the more advanced EU economies.  
3.3.1 Share of Food in the CPI  
It is a common pattern in the new EU economies that the proportion of food items in consumer 
baskets is higher than the EU average. Due to the higher volatility of food prices as compared to 
non-food items, the volatility of inflation in the new EU countries should be higher than in the 
advanced economies, other things being equal. Figure 5 compares the share of food items in the 
HICP between selected EU-25 countries.  
Figure 5: Share of food items in the HICP in selected EU countries in 2004  
26,9
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Source: Eurostat, NewCronos.  
 
3.3.2 Energy Intensity of Output  
Another characteristic structural feature of the new EU economies inherited from the period of 
central planning is the higher energy intensity of their output. Figure 6 compares the energy 
intensity of the Czech Republic with several other EU economies.  
Although the energy intensity of output in the Czech Republic (and also in Hungary) declined 
over the given period, it is still substantially higher than in Germany and France. This implies 
that energy shocks are likely to generate higher inflation in the Czech Republic than in other 
countries with lower energy intensity, other things being equal. The inflation volatility due to 
the shocks is supposed to remain higher until the structural convergence has been completed. 
In Section 4, we simulate the impact of several shocks on inflation to get an approximate view 
of how these could complicate the meeting of the MIC in the case of the Czech Republic.  16   Vít Bárta  
 



























































































Source: Eurostat, NewCronos.  
  
3.4 Likely Inflation Patterns: Summary  
We have tried to show that inflation in the Czech Republic in the medium and long run will be 
different from that typical of the advanced EU economies. Specifically, level factors are likely to 
keep Czech inflation systematically above the EMU average if the real appreciation of the koruna 
is not accompanied by equally high nominal appreciation. Also, it can be argued that cyclical 
factors may keep the volatility of inflation above that recorded in the more developed economies. 
Finally, we suggest that the sensitivity of Czech inflation to food and energy shocks should be 
higher than in countries where the share of these items in the HICP is lower.
16 The combined 
effect of the above factors on inflation is shown in a stylised way in Figure 7.  




                                                           
16 We are well aware that the above features do not fully describe the overall inflation patterns. There are many 
other factors which matter as well. These include, for example, the type of exchange rate regime, the patterns of 
pass-through from the exchange rate, the credibility of monetary policy, the process of wage formation, fiscal 
policy, etc. The majority of the relevant aspects are captured by the model which we use for our simulations.    Fulfilment of the Maastricht Inflation Criterion by the Czech Republic   17 
 
The figure suggests that during some periods inflation in the Czech Republic is below the MIC, 
while over the remaining periods it may be above it, implying potential failure to meet the MIC 
(these periods are shown in red). It is obvious that the timing of the reference period is of crucial 
importance. From the cyclical point of view, the window of opportunity for the adoption of the 
euro thus need not always be open, and postponement of the adoption of the euro may thus be a 
feasible policy option under certain circumstances.  
It should be noted that the above inflation patterns are determined by factors that can be subsumed 
under the heading of a structural gap (see Backé/Thimann, 2004) between the Czech economy and 
the euro area. We believe that as structural convergence progresses, the cyclical pattern of 
inflation in the Czech Republic will flatten and the relatively higher sensitivity of inflation to 
shocks will diminish. For the same reason, real convergence will lead to a closing of the gap in 
relative income levels, implying a slowdown in real appreciation. As a consequence of structural 
convergence, the risks of possibly missing the MIC should diminish over time. Nevertheless, 
structural convergence will hardly be completed in less than one decade, so some risks of failure 
to meet the MIC will persist unless actively opposed by economic policies (see Section 6).  
4. Simulations of Disinflation and Inflation Shocks  
The discussions in the preceding sections allow us to formulate the set of conditions for the 
simulations investigating the impact of meeting the Maastricht criteria. Specifically, we study the 
costs of three scenarios of disinflation in terms of output loss (sub-sections 1 to 5). In the final 
subsection we study the impacts of several shocks to inflation.  
4.1 The Model Used  
For the simulation of disinflation shocks we use the Quarterly Projection Model (QPM) applied in 
the CNB for forecasting inflation. The QPM is a simple forward-looking semi-structural flow 
model of the monetary business cycle with calibrated parameters describing the dynamics of the 
main macroeconomic variables in the medium term. It captures the main channels of monetary 
transmission and specifies the nexus of output, employment, interest rates, exchange rates and 
inflation within a framework where monetary policy influences the economy and inflation. The 
model is a version of what has been called a “gaps” model. Its task is to explain the dynamics of 
disequilibrium paths and, in particular, how “gaps” (deviations of economic variables from their 
equilibrium values) evolve and dissipate over the medium to long run. In “gap” models, nothing is 
said about the nature of the levels of equilibrium, and, in particular, there is no supply side, no 
stocks, and no attention to asset equilibrium as part of the model. The core of the model consists 
of these four equations:  
•  a PC curve that captures the relationship between inflation and the output gap based on the 
assumption of staggered price- and wage-setting; 
•  an IS curve which represents the relationship between the real monetary conditions index and 
the output gap; 
•  a UIP equation that relates the nominal exchange rate to movements in domestic and foreign 
interest rates; 18   Vít Bárta  
 
•  a reaction function representing a monetary rule for setting interest rates with the aim of 
minimising the deviations of the variables from their targets (inflation, potential output) with 
respect to other preferences and limitations.
17  
 
Although the QPM may not, for methodological reasons, be ideal for our exercise, it is 
undoubtedly the best model currently available. We should keep in mind that the purpose of our 
simulations is to get an approximate idea of the order of the potential output losses.  
4.2 Output Loss: 1
st Loss Function  
For every monetary policy action it is necessary to have a criterion by which its impact can be 
assessed. This criterion is indispensable for comparing the different monetary policy strategies 
followed by the central bank. In general, the bank’s loss function is defined as the weighted 
deviations from targets and is used as a fundamental measure of loss. Engineering a disinflation 
typically involves short-term costs associated with a corresponding loss of output. The reason 
disinflationary episodes have this effect on economic activity is that prices are to a great extent 
characterised by persistence and inertia. The output costs of a disinflationary policy are usually 
referred to as the sacrifice ratio. For our simulations we define the loss function as a sacrifice 
ratio. The loss function is the cumulative loss in output associated with a permanent reduction in 
inflation. The cumulative loss of output is not normalised by the amount of the inflation decrease 
in order to enable a comparison of different disinflation experiments.
18  
In the case of QPM experiments, the cumulative sum of the output gap has to be divided by 
four, because the output gap is expressed on a quarterly basis. The loss function is then the 
loss (in percentage points) from the cumulative sum of the potential output over the whole 
period of the simulation. The “best” fulfilment of the MIC is then defined as that which 
minimises the loss function, thus being the friendliest towards real convergence.  
4.3 Assumptions of Simulations  
In this sub-section we summarise the basic assumptions used in the simulations.  
4.3.1 Technical Assumptions  
  At the beginning of each simulation the economy is operating at its potential and there is no 
difference between the inflation target and actual inflation. 
  The initial nominal exchange rate is equal to the ERM II central parity. 
  The disinflation shock is technically implemented through a change in the inflation target, i.e. 
the rate of inflation has to change from some initial level defined by the “old” target to 
another level given by the “new” target.  
  The increase in regulated prices will be identical to the pace of CPI growth throughout the 
simulation period. 
                                                           
17 For a detailed description of the QPM, see Czech National Bank (2003): The Czech National Bank’s 
Forecasting and Policy Analysis System, edited by W. Coats, D. Laxton and D. Rose, Prague, February.   
 
18 Understandably, a higher decrease in the targeted level of inflation implies higher cumulative losses.  Fulfilment of the Maastricht Inflation Criterion by the Czech Republic   19 
 
  The MIC is considered to be fulfilled if the rate of inflation (the 12-month moving average of 
the HICP) reaches a level which is not higher than one tenth of a percentage point (10 basis 
points) above the MIC expressed to one decimal point. 
  The CPI is equal to the HICP.
19 
 
The QPM has no parameters or equations to account for the ERM II regime. As a result, the 
simulations suppose that the monetary authority controls both the exchange rate and inflation by 
interest rates only. The choice of target is thus not independent. Should we wish to control 
inflation and keep the exchange rate close to fixed in the long run, the properties of the economy 
embodied in the model would constrain it. The authority cannot change the real variables over the 
long run, so the Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) condition must be fulfilled. 
4.3.2 Policy Assumptions  
The discussion in Section 3 implies that inflation in the Czech Republic is likely to be somewhat 
above the EU-25 average and that fulfilling the MIC might require disinflation. Therefore, we 
simulate disinflation shocks. The assumption about the inflation level in the EU is derived from 
average inflation in the EU-25 during 1999–2004 (see Table 5).
20  
Table 5:  Inflation in the EU during 1999–2004 (y-o-y HICP in %)  
Average 
  
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1999-04 2000-04 
EU-25  1.6 2.4 2.5 2.1 1.9 2.1  2.1  2.2 
EU-15  1.2 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0  1.9  2.0 
Eurozone-12  1.1 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.1  2.0  2.2 
Source: Eurostat, author’s computations.  
 
The assumption about the real appreciation of the koruna is derived from the discussion in Section 
3.1.2. We define three disinflation alternatives, believing that a 1.5% real appreciation of the 
koruna vis-à-vis the euro over next five years (as a basic scenario) is consistent with the prevailing 
opinion. A somewhat lower (1%) and somewhat higher (2%) pace of real appreciation represent, 
respectively, a slightly more and slightly less conservative alternative. Also, we assume that the 
real appreciation is fully transformed to inflation. This assumption is derived from the fact that the 
CNB’s point inflation target (effective from January 2006) was set above the ECB inflation target 
to allow for real convergence of the Czech economy also through the inflation differential (see 
CNB/2004).
21 The assumption about the level of the MIC is derived from the average value of the 
                                                           
19 This assumption is not entirely realistic. In reality, the difference between the CPI and HICP is about 0.2–0.3 
percentage points (for more details see the Appendix).  
20 This assumption can be considered balanced. On the one hand, the value of 2.1% includes the relatively high 
inflation rates of the former accession countries during their disinflation periods. On the other hand, the level of 
inflation in this period was influenced by the positive disinflation shock in 1999, as is obvious by comparison 
with the average during 2000–2004.  
21 In Section 6.5, we discuss a lowering of the CNB point inflation target to get better guidance towards meeting 
the MIC. The possible downward adjustment of the target can be considered a disinflation shock.  20   Vít Bárta  
 
MIC during 1999–2004 (see Table 1 in Section 2).
22 All the initial policy assumptions are 
contained in Table 6.  

















  (1)  (2)  (3) = (1) + (2)  (4)  (5) = (3) – (4) 
A  2.1  1.0     3.1
23 2.6  0.5 
B 2.1 1.5  3.6  2.6 1.0 
C 2.1 2.0  4.1  2.6 1.5 
 
The policy assumptions yield three initial inflation levels and thus three disinflation shocks: of 0.5 
p.p. (simulation “A”), 1 p.p. (simulation “B”) and 1.5 p.p. (simulation “C”). Even in simulation 
“C”, let alone simulations “A” and “B”, the initial inflation (4.1%) is almost consistent with the 
point inflation target of 3% (which has a tolerance band of ± 1 p.p.).  
The second set of assumptions is derived from the length of time required to meet the MIC. In an 
“unrestricted” simulation “0”, we study how much time would be required to reach the requested 
inflation level. Should the time horizon be too long we would then investigate what policies are 
needed to fulfil the targeted level of inflation within a shorter period. Table 7 shows four 
alternative time limits.  
Table 7: Time restrictions for disinflation simulations  
Simulation  Time required to meet the MIC 
0 no  limit 
1 10  quarters 
2 8  quarters 
3 6  quarters
24 
 
We carry out simulations that combine both sets of criteria.  
4.4 Simulation Results  
The simulation results are summarised in Table 8. Each simulation is marked according to 
aggressivity of the rule (the number) and the size of the inflation decrease (the letter). The second 
column contains the time restrictions imposed on the simulations. The “MIC” column shows how 
many quarters are needed for fulfilment of the MIC (for example, in the case of simulation “0.A” 
it takes 13 quarters to decrease inflation by 0.5 p.p.). The “MERC” column shows the 
performance of the MERC criterion. This performance is measured over two years, namely one 
                                                           
22 This assumption may be a bit conservative. As we shall see in Section 5, even lower values of the MIC are 
conceivable when one applies the EU-25 or EU-27 set as the basis for computing the MIC.  
23 The initial inflation level in simulation “A” (3.1%) is consistent with the average inflation level in Spain, 
Portugal and Greece during 1999–2004.  
24 The horizon of six quarters is identical to the so-called “horizon of most effective transmission” which is 
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year before the fulfilment of the MIC and over the whole year that the MIC is fulfilled. The extent 
of the overall nominal appreciation over two years is expressed as a percentage. For example, 
simulation “3.B” (disinflation by 1 p.p. reached in six quarters) implies that the nominal exchange 
rate will appreciate against the ERM II central parity by 2.27% over the two-year probationary 
period.  
Table 8: Simulation results of disinflation shocks  









nd loss function: 
initial change in 
interest rate  
Simulation 
 
quarters  %  in % of GDP  in p.p. 
0.A 13  0.71  -0.5  0.06 
0.B 13  1.42    -1.0  0.13 
 
0.C 13  2.14  -1.6  0.19 
1.A 10  0.97  -0.5  0.59 
1.B 10  1.93  -1.0  1.17 
1.C 10  2.90  -1.6  1.76 
2.A 8  1.06  -0.5  0.94 
2.B 8  2.12  -1.0  1.89 
2.C 8  3.18  -1.6  2.83 
3.A 6  1.14  -0.5  1.56 
3.B 6  2.27  -1.0  3.13 
3.C 6  3.41  -1.6  4.70 
Notes:  
1)  The MERC is measured over a period of 24 months (ERM II).  
2)  The output gap is measured over a period of 16 quarters.  
 
The fourth column shows the loss function in terms of the output gap related to each simulation. A 
decline in inflation of 0.5 p.p., 1 p.p. and 1.5 p.p. leads to a cumulative loss of output of about 
0.5%, 1% and 1.6% respectively of annual potential GDP over a period of four years.
25,26 It is 
intuitive that a steeper disinflation implies a greater output loss, and vice versa. Because of the 
linearity of the model, the output gaps are proportional to the disinflation shocks.  
Although the cumulative losses are identical in corresponding cases over the long run, the 
individual trajectories of the output losses differ. Figure 8 illustrates this on the example of 
simulation “C”, which engineers a disinflation of 1.5 p.p.  
                                                           
25 The costs of the disinflation shocks seem quite significant in all the simulations. In money terms, the four-year 
cumulative loss of GDP caused by a 1.5 p.p. disinflation amounts to about CZK 40 billion. This is equivalent to 
the budget of the Ministry of Defence for one year or to the budget of the Ministry of Health for four years.  
26 To compare, the National Bank of Poland (2004) simulated the impact of lowering inflation by 1 p.p. below 
the MPC target for a period of one year. Simulations show that this would be associated with GDP falling by 
0.3–0.8% below the baseline scenario at the two-year horizon.  22   Vít Bárta  
 
Figure 8: Output loss in simulation “C” 
a)  Quarterly                  b) Cumulative  
 
The left-hand panel shows that the fastest disinflation “3.C”, lasting for six quarters, generates the 
steepest widening of the output gap and also the steepest narrowing of the gap in the following 
period. On the other hand, the slowest disinflation “0.C” generates a modest output gap, but this 
gap persists longer. The right-hand panel shows the same story in cumulative terms. 
Approximately 17 quarters after the initiation of the disinflation shock, the cumulative output gaps 
of the individual trajectories become practically identical. The same conclusion applies to 
simulations “A” and “B” (so-called simulation reports containing details of the simulations are 
available from the author on request).  
4.5 Initial Change in Interest Rates: 2
nd Loss Function  
It should be noted that if we change the aggressivity of the monetary policy rule for a given 
disinflation, the output loss remains the same (for example, simulations “0.B”, “1.B”, “2.B” and 
“3.B” all imply an output loss of –1.0%). This is due to the fact that a change in the policy rule 
does not change the properties of the model. The crucial parameter does not change in these 
simulations and therefore a central bank (at least from this point of view) can use any rule 
irrespective of the extent of aggression.  
To be able to discriminate between simulation experiments dealing with a given disinflation 
shock, a second loss function has to be introduced. There are no a priori rules according to which 
the loss function should be defined. The loss function can basically reflect any economic or non-
economic variable which is taken into account by decision-makers. Changes in interest rates are 
the pivotal variables for central bankers. Although they represent the basic tool of monetary 
policy, their very use may also be subject to some limitations. One of them consists in the 
smoothing of interest rates. The observed tendency of many central banks to smooth interest rates 
is motivated by their desire to avoid surprising the markets. Central banks believe that the less 
surprising their decisions are, the more credible, predictable and effective their policy will Fulfilment of the Maastricht Inflation Criterion by the Czech Republic   23 
 
become. Interest rate smoothing thus may be subject to explicit or implicit optimisation, which 
requires defining the kind of loss function.
27  
In Table 8, the second loss function is in the fifth column and refers to the interest rate change in 
the first period of the simulation. This additional criterion enables us to compare scenarios which 
only differ in the rule chosen. In the case of the standard reaction (simulation “0”) it takes 13 
quarters to reach the new level of inflation. In order to be able to fulfil the MIC in a shorter 
period, the central bank has to implement a more aggressive policy, which is modelled through a 
more aggressive reaction function.
28 This is done in simulations “1.A.”–“3.C.”, with all other 
circumstances remaining unchanged.  
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The reaction function has four parameters. The parameter m0 denotes the persistence of the 
reaction function. This coefficient reflects the uncertainty about inflation forecasting and the 
inertia in monetary policy decisions. The parameter m1 expresses the aggressivity of the rule. The 
higher the value of this coefficient, the higher the response of the interest rate to the deviation of 
the inflation forecast from the inflation target and to the output gap. The two remaining 
parameters are the relative weights w1 and w2. These reflect the relevance of each variable to the 
monetary policy decision. Table 9 shows the monetary policy rules used, in terms of persistence, 
aggressivity and weights.  








Weight on  
inflation : output 
0 0.75  1.2  3:1 
1 0.25  4.8  12:1 
2 0.25  9.6  24:1 
3 0.25  19.2 48:1 
 
The parameters of the rule were chosen in such a way as to enable the desired level of inflation to 
be reached within 10, 8 and 6 quarters. Along with the change in the aggressivity of the rule, the 
weight on the deviation of inflation from the target was increased and the interest rate persistence 
was lowered from 0.75 to 0.25.  
The graphical interpretation of the interest rate changes (the last column in Table 8) is provided in 
Figure 9. It shows the trade-off between the time needed to fulfil the MIC and the initial interest 
rate change.  
                                                           
27 When discussing the policy rules for an inflation targeting regime, Rudebusch/Svensson (1998) develop a 
model in which the loss function also includes some weight on the variability of interest rate changes.  
28 In the reaction function the decisions on where to set the policy instrument (the short-term interest rate) today 
are made by considering what is likely to happen in the future. The equation says that if headline CPI inflation is 
forecast to be above the target rate, 
Tar π , where the forecast is for the next four quarters, then the central bank 
acts to push up the short-term (one-quarter) interest rate, all else being equal. 24   Vít Bárta  
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The results confirm that the second loss function enables us to discriminate between different 
steepnesses of a given disinflation path. It is apparent that the shorter the time available for 
fulfilment of the MIC (at a given disinflation shock) the higher the initial interest rate increase 
must be. It would then be up to the decision-makers to opt for such an interest rate change that 
would not provoke unnecessary (= too costly) reactions of major macroeconomic variables (their 
simulated paths are available in the simulation reports).
29  
The third column of Table 8 shows the percentage change in the exchange rate at the end of 
the 24-month reference period. In accordance with intuition, no simulated disinflation shock 
yields a depreciation of the exchange rate. Also, it is obvious that smaller disinflation shocks 
imply less nominal appreciation than bigger disinflation shocks. Finally, the speed of 
disinflation does not seem to be so important a factor when discriminating between the four 
different time horizons within a given disinflation shock. The results show that even if we 
consider the fastest and strongest disinflation shock (“3.C”) the nominal exchange rate at the 
end of the reference period should not be higher than 3–4%. The nominal appreciation in the 
other simulations remains rather modest. As we shall see in Section 5, an appreciation of this 
order should not provoke any worries.  
                                                           
29 If we arbitrarily adopt a one percentage point change in the interest rate above the baseline (the non-Maastricht 
trajectory of interest rates) as the highest feasible (and affordable) increase in rates, we see that the scope for 
monetary action shrinks remarkably. Meeting the MIC is feasible only if a disinflation of 0.5 p.p. is engineered 
and if at the same time we do not need to meet the MIC faster than within eight quarters. The other possibilities 
(steeper disinflation together with faster fulfilment) are presumably beyond the reach of reasonable monetary 
policy. Attempts to implement a more aggressive policy increase the risk of undermining macroeconomic 
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4.6 Simulation of Shocks: Results 
In this sub-section, we briefly study (with the help of the QPM) the impacts of several shocks to 
Czech inflation. We assume that these shocks increase inflation but the central bank does not act 
to mitigate their impact. The purpose is to see to what extent the shocks can potentially 
complicate the fulfilment of the MIC.  
The domestic shocks are specified as follows. The food shock consists in an increase in food 
prices of 5 p.p. over one year.
30 The exchange rate shock is generated by a CZK/EUR 
depreciation of 5% over one year.
31 The fiscal policy shock is generated by an increase in the 
fiscal impulse of 1 p.p. of GDP over one year.
32  Figure 10 summarises the results of the 
simulations.  
Figure 10: Impact of food price shock, fiscal policy shock and exchange rate shock on inflation 
 
 
It is obvious that the exchange rate shock has about twice as great an impact on inflation than the 
food price shock. Both shocks have a sizeable impact on inflation. Were they to occur just during 
the reference period they could easily push inflation above the MIC, though only temporarily. On 
                                                           
30 The choice of a food price shock of this magnitude is straightforward. Food prices in the Czech Republic, as in 
many countries, are very volatile and their impact on overall inflation has been significant. Prices of food 
increased by 4.4% (y-o-y) in 1998, by 5.1% in 2001 and by 3.4% in 2004. The magnitude of the food price 
shock, reaching 5% over one year, is in line with the Czech experience in recent years.  
31 The exchange rate shock of this magnitude has its parallel in 2003, when the nominal exchange rate of the 
koruna depreciated against the euro by more than 5% (on a y-o-y basis) throughout most of the year.  
32 It can be argued that the likelihood of the emergence of a positive fiscal shock (especially during the 
probationary period, when consolidation of the fiscal position can be envisaged) is not particularly high. The 
purpose of simulating this shock is to provide a benchmark for the relative size of the other simulated shocks. 
Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that the Czech Republic will adopt the euro several years after 2010 and that the 
budget consolidation achieved in the meantime will permit some fiscal policy manoeuvring.  26   Vít Bárta  
 
the other hand, the fiscal policy shock seems to be less worrying, as it implies an increase in 
inflation of about 0.25 p.p. after one year.  
In addition to the three domestic shocks, we simulated the impacts of two external shocks.
33 The 
first – an oil shock – is specified as an increase in the price of oil of 30% over one year. This 
shock causes an increase in inflation of 0.3 p.p. above the baseline scenario in Germany, of 0.4 
p.p. above the baseline in the euro area, and of 1 p.p. above the baseline in the Visegrad countries. 
The simulation confirms the hypothesis of a higher energy intensity of output and possibly 
stronger pass-through to inflation in the new EU countries. In other words, should an oil shock hit 
the European economies, we can expect a higher increase in inflation in the new EU countries 
than in the EMU countries. This implies that meeting the MIC should be more difficult, because 
the shock would increase Czech inflation more than in those countries whose inflation will 
probably constitute the reference value for the MIC.  
The second external shock is specified as a shock to GDP growth in Germany of 1.2 p.p. above 
the baseline persisting for two years.
34 This is an example of an asymmetric shock, with rather 
more favourable implications for domestic inflation. While inflation in Germany would increase 
by 0.6–0.7 p.p. on a permanent basis, inflation in the Visegrad countries would increase by about 
0.2 p.p. over two years. Under certain circumstances
35 this implies less demanding conditions for 
meeting the MIC by the new EU countries. This outcome is consistent with intuition.  
To summarise, the shock simulation implies a large dispersion of the impacts of the different 
shocks. The strongest impact on inflation (at the given shock magnitudes) is caused by the 
exchange rate shock, followed by the food price shock and the oil shock. A relatively minor 
(negative) impact stems from the fiscal policy shock, and a positive impact would possibly be 
generated by the German GDP growth shock.  
4.7 Accuracy and Robustness of the Results 
Below, we touch upon the issue of the accuracy and robustness of the simulation results. 
Uncertainty may be associated with the following aspects:  
a)  The QPM itself. The simulations are carried out by the model at the core of the forecasting 
process in the CNB. Although the model does not capture all possible interactions within the 
economy, its results can be considered sufficiently robust. Ideally, the robustness check would 
require us to carry out the same simulations with some other models. However, this does not 
seem feasible with the available analytical tools.  
b)  The parameters of the model. Testing the robustness would consist in defining probability 
intervals for each parameter and generating probability intervals for the model outputs using 
the Monte Carlo method.  
                                                           
33 The two external shocks are analysed using the NIGEM. This model (developed by the National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research) is used in the CNB for analysing issues not captured by the QPM, in particular 
the relationship between the Czech economy and the European economy.  
34 The productivity shock in Germany can be justified by the initiation of economic reforms focused on 
enhancing the flexibility of labour markets and on increasing the competitiveness of the economy.  
35 These circumstances are far from being trivial. They depend on the “net impact” of the shock to inflation in 
each EU country possibly changing the composition of the countries whose inflation would be included in the 
computation of the MIC during the evolution of the shock.  Fulfilment of the Maastricht Inflation Criterion by the Czech Republic   27 
 
c)  Possible alignment of Czech long-term interest rates with foreign interest rates, or a 
modification of monetary policy. The application of the QPM in its current shape assumes an 
unchanged economic environment and also an inflation targeting framework. It could be 
presumed that Czech long-term interest rates will be aligned with foreign rates. This very fact, 
along with announcing the central parity, might require some adjustments to the model 
(especially the UIP condition). However, the potential impact of this adjustment is currently 
difficult to assess. In any case, it is important to be aware of the fact that it is impossible to set 
targets which may be contradictory.  
d)  Shocks. The simulations performed are deterministic only. Otherwise, it would be necessary to 
carry out Monte Carlo simulations and assess the uncertainty on their basis.  
 
It is obvious that integrating the accuracy and robustness of the simulation results into this paper 
would stretch it excessively. In fact, the paper focuses on the fulfilment of the MIC and on 
discussing relevant policy implications, rather than on assessing uncertainty. Therefore, we omit 
the assessment of accuracy and robustness altogether.  
5. Maastricht Monetary Criteria: Likely Application and Open Issues  
European integration is largely a political process. Therefore, it can be assumed that the 
examination of the Maastricht criteria will be carried out with a certain dose of judgement and 
tolerance. In this section we discuss several areas that may invite some discretion into the 
application of the MIC and the MERC. The findings will provide insights into the preferable ways 
of meeting these criteria and the corresponding policies.  
5.1 The Maastricht Convergence Criteria: Spirit Versus Letter  
The Maastricht Treaty provided the legal basis for the EMU. The idea of the union is simple, but 
its implementation rests on numerous details. This gives rise to a dilemma between the spirit of 
the Maastricht process and its inherent complexity on the one hand, and the limited number of 
macroeconomic variables which are translated to the convergence criteria on the other. While 
integration refers to low inflation, a flexible economy and disciplined policies all being achieved 
on a sustainable basis, the Maastricht convergence criteria represent an attempt to be a bit explicit 
and quantitative in those areas. The major problem is that the very criteria may stimulate an over-
preoccupation with “convergence accounting”, which may eventually drive attention away from 
long-term considerations towards short-termism. Such an approach might be fostered by the 
existence of relatively short reference periods (mostly one year only), as if these would be 
sufficient to prove that nominal convergence is sustainable. The critical issue of sustainability 
might then be resolved by referring to the past performance and future prospects of the relevant 
macroeconomic variables. However, the reference can be quite vague and the sustainability 
insufficiently defined. It is thus the discrepancy between the concept of sustainability and the 
simplicity of the convergence criteria that invites discretion when applying the criteria. This 
discrepancy can generate uncertainty about whether reference to the spirit will be sufficient if a 
euro applicant country fails to meet the letter.  
This uncertainty has been fostered by several decisions made by European institutions in the past. 
These have challenged not only the quantitative requirements, but also the spirit of the integration, 28   Vít Bárta  
 
leading to the emergence of precedents.
36 Moreover, many policy-makers and researchers 
acknowledge that the new EU countries (due to their substantial income gaps vis-à-vis the EMU 
average) are in a different situation than the founding members of the EMU were. Therefore, they 
propose that the convergence criteria should take this into account accordingly (e.g. Buiter/Grafe, 
2002).
37 All this raises the question of how “seriously” the letter of the Maastricht criteria should 
be considered and what the implications could be for the strategy of the next EMU applicants. 
5.2 Inflation Criterion  
5.2.1 Definition  
Article 121 (1), first indent, of the Treaty requires: “the achievement of a high degree of price 
stability; this will be apparent from a rate of inflation which is close to that of, at most, the three 
best-performing Member States in terms of price stability”.
 38 Article 1 of the Protocol on the 
convergence criteria referred to in Article 121 of the Treaty stipulates that: “the criterion on price 
stability referred to in the first indent of Article 121 (1) of this Treaty shall mean that a Member 
State has a price performance that is sustainable and an average rate of inflation, observed over 
a period of one year before the examination, that does not exceed by more than 1.5 percentage 
points that of, at most, the three best-performing Member States in terms of price stability. 
Inflation shall be measured by means of the consumer price index on a comparable basis, taking 
into account differences in national definitions.”  
Be it intentional or accidental, the reference value for inflation is not very precisely defined, thus 
allowing for some discretion in its application. This is the case in spite of the fact that the equal 
treatment principle – requiring the Treaty to be applied as consistently as possible across countries 
and across time – limits the discretion.
39 When assessing this discretion not only the Treaty, but 
also the evolution of the application framework has to be taken into account.
40  
5.2.1 Notion of “Member State”  
One area for discretion relates to the notion of “Member State”. This issue has already arisen in 
the European Commission’s 1998, 2000 and 2002 Convergence Reports. The reports discussed 
the implications of the third stage of EMU for the operational definition of the MIC. Specifically, 
                                                           
36 In the case of the exchange rate criterion, the letter of the Treaty and Protocol has been challenged three times. 
Although the Treaty and Protocol do not explicitly require ERM membership as a part of the exchange rate 
requirement, they do require the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange rate mechanism of the 
European Monetary System to have been met during the last two years before the examination. Similar 
flexibility in interpreting the rules was manifested when the debt criterion for Belgium was examined.  
37 Suggestions to redefine the MIC upwards are very frequent. One typical proposal is to set the MIC at 3.5%     
(= the inflation target of the ECB + 1.5 percentage points), see Schadler et al. (2004).  
38 It is useful to remember that at the time the Treaty was drawn up, no widely accepted definition of price 
stability existed. The reference to the “best performers in terms of price stability” provided the standard long 
before the start of the monetary union.  
39 The principle of equal treatment implies that, as far as possible, Member States joining later should not be 
confronted with additional hurdles nor be allowed to join on looser terms than the first-round entrants.  
40 In 2004, the ECB introduced a more precise definition of price stability, which is now “below but close to 
2%”. It can be argued that this definition excludes unusually low levels of inflation (e.g. 0.3%) from the basis for 
calculating the MIC and that the MIC at a level such as 3.3% (= 1.8% + 1.5 p.p.) or even 3.5% is not in 
contradiction with the letter of the Treaty. The ECB in a letter to the CNB (dated 3 September 2004) stated that it 
does not want to depart from the original interpretation of the criteria as introduced in the 1990s.  Fulfilment of the Maastricht Inflation Criterion by the Czech Republic   29 
 
they reflected on the fact that the Treaty did not anticipate the distinction between initial and late 
entrants to the euro area and that the Third Stage was already underway. Considering that the 
Treaty was not explicit as to whether or not the Member States outside the euro area should be 
part of the group of reference countries, the 2000 and 2002 Reports calculated the reference 
values based on both sets of countries, i.e. the euro area (the 11 founding countries) and the EU-
15.  










































MIC III (EU-25 excluding negative inflation in Lithuania and CR)
 
Source: Eurostat, author’s computations.  
Note:   For the purposes of illustration, the solid MIC III includes negative values of inflation in the 
Czech Republic (during 5/2003–12/2003) and in Lithuania (during 2/2003–8/2004). The 
dotted MIC III excludes these values.  
Figure 11 shows three trajectories of the MIC based on the EMU-12, EU-15 and EU-25. The 
difference between the reference values derived from the different sets of countries is striking. 
The initial period, until mid-1999, was characterised by disinflation. Institutionally this was 
driven by preparation for Stage Three of the EMU, and economically by a positive supply shock. 
The inflation of the former accession countries was at that time too high to divert MIC III from 
either MIC I or MIC II. In the subsequent period, until mid-2002, a differentiation between the 
three measures emerged. The difference between MIC I and MIC II reached almost 0.5 percentage 
points at one point, due to low inflation in Sweden and the UK. A dramatic development occurred 
during 2003–2004. While MIC I was quite close to MIC II, MIC III diverged by a huge margin, 
reaching almost 1.5 percentage points in mid-2003. This was due to two reasons. On the one hand, 
inflation in the former accession countries decreased to lower levels than before as a result of their 
disinflation efforts. On the other hand, inflation in the newly-acceding countries turned out to be 
more volatile than inflation in the EU-15. During 2003, when European economies were exposed 
to disinflation shocks, inflation in Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Poland entered the 
computations either in the range of “statistical deflation” or close to it.  
When the inflation of a country defines the basis for computation of the MIC, there is no need to 
worry about the ability of this country to meet the MIC. Nevertheless, it is easy to imagine what 
such a situation would imply for countries like Sweden or the United Kingdom if they were to 
undergo their probationary period simultaneously with countries characterised by rather volatile 
inflation. Instead of the more advanced countries imposing demanding requirements on the less 30   Vít Bárta  
 
advanced countries, such a development would paradoxically imply that the less advanced 
countries would impose (unnecessarily) demanding requirements on the more advanced countries. 
The equal treatment clause thus could acquire an unexpected meaning unthinkable several years 
ago. In any case, the differences between MIC I, MIC II and MIC III provide an incentive for 
EMU candidate countries to negotiate the application of a narrow (less demanding) set of 
countries (EMU) rather than of a wide (more demanding) one (EU-25) for the computation of the 
MIC.
41  
5.2.3 Inflation “Outliers”: “Normal” Versus “Abnormal” Inflation  
The second area for judgement relates to inflation performance which might not be considered 
“normal”. The ECB has repeatedly declared that negative inflation rates, should they occur, would 
not be consistent with price stability. This approach is rooted in the 1998 EMI Convergence 
Report, which introduced the concept of “outlier” to deal appropriately with potential significant 
distortions in individual countries’ inflation paths. The purpose of this procedure is to exclude 
from the calculation of the reference value such inflation figures which would reduce the 
usefulness of the reference value as an economically meaningful benchmark.  
The “outlier” approach was applied in the Convergence Report 2004. The price performance of 
Lithuania was found to be exceptional (“abnormal”) and therefore not included in the computation 
of the MIC. The 12-month moving average of the HICP in Lithuania during the reference period 
(September 2003–August 2004) reached -0.2%. The basis for the MIC benchmark was established 
by inflation in Finland (0.4%), Denmark (1.0%) and Sweden (1.3%), whose rates were considered 
to be “normal”. Scope for possible discretion could be seen in the fact that Lithuania might 
potentially have served (although it did not do so, due to its unusual price performance) as the 
basis for computation of the MIC, having been a fully-fledged (EU) Member State for only one 
third of the reference period.
42 A similar situation may potentially occur when Bulgaria and 
Romania become EU members and some of the euro applicants simultaneously go through their 
reference periods.  
Generally, the inflation patterns observed in the 25 European countries during 2003–2004 were 
somewhat untidy. Lithuanian inflation, which in August was excluded from the computation of 
the MIC, reached 0.5% (on a y-o-y basis) in October (i.e. within only two months), becoming 
higher than inflation in Finland, which declined to 0.3% in that month and on down to 0.1% in 
December. It can only be speculated whether Finnish inflation would also have been considered 
“abnormal” had the reference period included the December values.
43 Most likely, inflation in the 
Czech Republic during May 2003–December 2003 would also have been found “abnormal”, as it 
stayed in negative territory throughout the period. Unusual price development was also observed 
                                                           
41 The average levels of MIC I, MIC II and MIC III during January/1998–December/2004 were 2.8%, 2.6% and 
2.3% respectively.  
42 Lithuania (like the other new EU members) joined the EU in May 2004, being a “Member State” for only 4 
out of the 12 months of the reference period. 
43 The issue of excluding negative inflation is actually trickier than it seems at first sight. It is difficult to justify 
why the “whole” negative inflation is excluded. It can be argued that instead of negative inflation, zero inflation 
should be used for the computation. Indeed, the simultaneous occurrence of negative or close to zero inflation in 
several countries conveys some relevant information about macroeconomic and monetary circumstances. Had 
this approach been applied in October 2004, the MIC would have been 2% instead of 2.4%. The reference 
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in Poland, where inflation remained below 1% for almost a year (between April 2003 and 
February 2004).  
All this seems to say that the enlargement of the EU created a more heterogeneous set of countries 
which may display quite disparate inflation patterns.
44 Consequently, the examination of these 
patterns for the purposes of calculating the “correct” level of the MIC will have to be quite 
sensitive in order to comply with economic rationale on the one hand and the equal treatment 
principle on the other. By the same token, this diversity opens up possibilities for discretionary 
decision-making and for political pressures.  
5.3 Exchange Rate Criterion  
The exchange rate criterion is a hotly debated topic. This is because the definition of the criterion 
is not unambiguous and the examination approaches of the European authorities have evolved 
over time. Also, past application practice has given rise to precedents that provoke discussions 
among researchers and policy-makers. Although guidance on the application of the criterion is 
provided by the Treaty, complementary position papers from Ecofin and the ECB, and the 
Commission and ECB Convergence Reports, the existing framework still allows for some degree 
of judgement.  
Major uncertainty is connected with the numerical values of the exchange rate amplitudes that 
will be still considered compliant with the requirement for exchange rate stability. Particular 
attention has been directed towards the ±2.25% band. It should be noted that some documents 
contain an explicit reference to this band while others do not. For example, the European 
Commission in its 2002 Convergence Report requires the “exchange rate to have been 
maintained within a fluctuation band of ±2.25% around the currency’s central parity against the 
euro in the context of the ERM II”. On the other hand, the ECB in its 2003 Policy Position and in 
the 2004 Convergence Report makes no quantitative reference to such a band when examining 
exchange rate stability. The Report says that “the assessment of exchange rate stability against 
the euro focuses on the exchange rate being close to the ERM II central rate while also taking into 
account the factors that may have led to an appreciation…” and adds that “the width of the 
fluctuation band within ERM II does not prejudice the assessment of the exchange rate stability 
criterion”. The 2004 Convergence Report repeats what had already been said in previous 
documents, namely that the “issue of the absence of ‘severe tensions’ is generally addressed by i) 
examining the degree of deviation of exchange rates from the ERM II central rates against the 
euro; ii) using indicators such as short-term interest rate differentials vis-à-vis the euro area and 
their development; and iii) considering the role played by foreign exchange interventions”. It thus 
seems that the MERC is not open to more specific ex ante quantification than that expressed in the 
2004 ECB Convergence Report.  
Taking into account the relevant legislation together with the precedents, the likely application of 
the MERC could be as follows (compare with Komárek/Čech/Horváth, 2003).  
                                                           
44 We do not want to suggest that the former EU-15 was free from inflation volatility. Finland was on the verge 
of deflation in the first half of 1996, and inflation in Sweden and Austria was below 0.5% in the middle of 1999. 32   Vít Bárta  
 
The MERC is fulfilled if: 
•  the exchange rate stays within the band of –2.25% to +15% over the reference period;
45 
•  the exchange rate appreciates above the +15% upper margin of the ERM II over the 
reference period due to the catching-up process; 
•  the country revaluates its central parity during the reference period and the new parity 
proves to be sustainable over the rest of the period;
46  
•  the exchange rate breaches the –2.25% lower margin and:  
o  the breach does qualify as severe tension, 
o  the amplitude of the breach is modest, 
o  the breach is temporary.
47  
 
The MERC is not fulfilled if:  
•  the breach of the –2.25% lower margin persists for an extended period of time; 
•  the amplitude of the breach is high (for example above 10%); 
•  the breach qualifies as severe tension; 
•  the country adjusts its central parity downwards.  
 
The second uncertainty as regards meeting the MERC is related to the length of the reference 
period. All recent relevant EU documents stress that the authorities will examine whether the 
country has participated in ERM II for a period of at least two years prior to the examination. 
However, the wording of the 2002 European Commission Convergence Report implies that 
participation in ERM II for at least two years is “expected” and that exchange rate stability during 
the period of non-participation before entering ERM II can also be taken into account. The 
precedents of Italy and Finland show that it is also possible to fulfil the MERC on an ex post 
basis.
48 The equal treatment principle should thus allow for shorter participation in ERM II at the 
time of the examination. In other words, we presume that the MERC duration test will be passed 
if the Member State is in ERM II at the time of the examination and if the period between its 
ERM II entry and adoption of the euro is no shorter than two years.  
6. Discussion of Policy Options  
In Section 4, we quantified the costs of disinflation and in Section 5 we studied the likely scope 
for discretion in applying the MIC and the MERC. In this section, we put the above analyses 
together and summarise the policy options that seem to be available for meeting the Maastricht 
requirements.  
                                                           
45 The Irish pound was on average 4.6% above its central parity during the reference period, with its appreciation 
peak reaching almost 11%. The Greek drachma was on average more than 6% above its central parity, with the 
maximum deviation reaching 9% (Schadler et al., 2004).  
46 Shortly before the fixing of the conversion rate, the central parity of Irish pound was revaluated by 3% and the 
central parity of the Greek drachma by 3.5% (Schadler et al., 2004).  
47 The Irish pound entered the two-year reference period around 4% below the central parity and remained below 
the -2.25% margin for 32 business days (Komárek/Čech/Horváth, 2003).  
48 At the time the decision to admit Italy and Finland was made (on 2 May 1998), Italy had spent 17 months in 
the ERM (having rejoined on 25 November 1996) and Finland 18 months (having rejoined on 14 October 1996). 
In the case of Greece, the time that elapsed between its joining the ERM (on 1 January 1999) and the decision to 
admit the country as a member of the EMU (on 19 June 2000) was 17 months (see Buiter/Grafe, 2002).  Fulfilment of the Maastricht Inflation Criterion by the Czech Republic   33 
 
6.1 Trade-off between the MIC and MERC: Fiction or Reality?  
For many economists, a major source of uncertainty relating to the fulfilment of the Maastricht 
monetary criteria is whether the MERC is symmetric or asymmetric. A symmetric understanding 
of the MERC led many to believe in a trade-off between the MIC and the MERC. The trade-off 
implies that if a country maintains a fixed exchange rate regime (such as a currency board) the 
real appreciation of the currency will cause either a potential difficulty on the inflation front or a 
recession caused by disinflation. If, on the other hand, a country practises inflation targeting (with 
a flexible exchange rate), fulfilment of the MIC should be easier, but there is a risk of 
inconsistency with the MERC and ERM II.  
Perceiving this dilemma as given, Buiter/Grafe (2002) require a re-definition of the MIC in terms 
of the inflation rate of traded goods if an EMU candidate wants to maintain a fixed exchange rate 
during the reference period and to avoid an unnecessary recession. Or, they propose negotiating a 
derogation (waiver) from the exchange rate requirement for those EMU candidates that wish to 
maintain inflation targeting.
49  
Natalucci/Ravenna (2002) study the consequences of large productivity gains on the choice of 
exchange rate regimes in new Member States during the process of accession to the EMU. They 
develop a GE model of an emerging market economy and show that under a fixed or heavily 
managed exchange rate the BSE might prevent compliance with the MIC unless a contractionary 
policy is adopted. They claim that the requirement of membership in ERM II and the MIC 
constrain the policy choice while providing no additional benefit to countries credibly committed 
to joining the euro. They conclude that relaxation of one criterion or another has strongly 
differentiated business cycle implications for EMU candidates. Specifically, they show that policy 
rules allowing for higher exchange rate flexibility lower the volatility of the economy in terms of 
the inflation rate and the output gap.  
Bulíř/Šmídková (2005) suggest that the fact that currencies will be fixed during ERM II implies a 
possible conflict between trend appreciation of the real exchange rate and the EMU criteria of low 
inflation and a stable nominal exchange rate. However, for them the main risk relates to the fact 
that considering the current (and presumably persisting) over-appreciation of the koruna (and also 
the zloty and forint) a too early fixing at an improper parity during ERM II may set in motion a 
costly adjustment process running through domestic prices and wages.  
In  Section 5, we tried to show that the MERC is asymmetric: while a nominal appreciation 
basically has no limit (especially if it can be attributed to catching-up), a nominal depreciation 
beyond -2.25% may become inconsistent with the MERC. This implies that the trade-off between 
the MIC and MERC is avoidable (at least from the “legal” point of view).  
The crucial issue is whether the relationship between nominal appreciation and inflation is under 
the control of policies. If it is under control, advisable policies should transform the real 
                                                           
49 They perceive meeting the criteria as an investment without any return. They consider the Maastricht exercise 
to be pointless and costly because the reputational capital accumulated through a costly and risky investment 
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appreciation to nominal appreciation to limit the risk of missing the MIC. On the other hand, if 
this control is weak, real appreciation may lead to failure to meet the MIC.
50  
The answer to the question in the title of this sub-section is thus conditional. If policies have the 
relationship between nominal appreciation and inflation under control, the trade-off between the 
MIC and MERC is a fiction. If this control is limited or non-existent, and, moreover, the country 
enjoys fast real appreciation, simultaneous fulfilment of the MIC and MERC may become 
problematic.  
6.2 “Hard” Versus “Soft” Fulfilment of the Criteria  
Because the relationship between nominal appreciation and inflation may not always be fully 
under control, policy-makers may be interested in having some “safety measures” at their 
disposal. Below, we develop a taxonomy of fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria.  
There are basically two ways of dealing with the Maastricht requirements: policy-makers can 
either respect the Maastricht criteria and adjust their policies accordingly, or attempt to “adjust” 
the criteria themselves. Respecting the criteria also leads to two possibilities. Either the Maastricht 
criteria can be taken at their face value and met via adjustment of the real economy (we could call 
this “hard fulfilment”), or fulfilment of the criteria can be attempted by cheating in some way (we 
could call this “cheap fulfilment”).
51  
“Adjustment” of the convergence criteria themselves (achievable through political negotiations) 
would be motivated by a softening of their possibly adverse impact on the real economy (we 
could label this approach as “soft fulfilment”). Again, two kinds of “soft fulfilment” are 
conceivable. The first involves re-negotiating some of the criteria: e.g. instead of a 1.5 percentage 
point margin, a 2 percentage point margin could be demanded (along the lines of Buiter/Grafe, 
2002). This version would be an explicit one and might require a derogation granted in an ex ante 
manner.
52 The second possibility involves relaxed interpretation of the criteria (e.g. higher 
tolerance to wider fluctuations of the exchange rate or the acceptance of an inflation outcome that 
is a small margin above the MIC). This possibility is implicit, ad-hoc based and “granted” in an ex 
post manner.  
6.3 Fixed Versus Flexible Approach Towards the Euro 
We can differentiate between two approaches or phases towards the euro: a fixed approach and a 
flexible approach. In the case of a fixed approach, the date of adoption would be stipulated 
                                                           
50 An investigation of whether the Czech economy and its policy framework allow for having control over this 
relationship is beyond the attention of this paper.  
51 “Cheap fulfilment” could be attained in a number of ways. One of them could consist (for example) in 
purposeful manipulation of indirect taxes or administered prices just during the reference period. This kind of 
“fulfilment” is achievable basically through government action. An extreme version of “cheap fulfilment” in the 
case of the fiscal criteria was applied by Greece by hiding its actual budgetary situation during the period of the 
examination. The option of “cheap fulfilment” is available to policy-makers at basically any time and it would be 
at the discretion of all parties engaged in the examination process to decide whether it is acceptable. However, 
there is probably nothing useful to be said about “cheap fulfilment” from the economic point of view.  
52 An example of an attempt to facilitate the fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria in an ex ante manner is provided 
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(possibly a long time) in advance and all economic policies would be tuned accordingly (most 
probably irrespective of the costs incurred). On the other hand, under a flexible approach the 
conditions for meeting Maastricht would be assessed on a continuous basis and the decision about 
entry into the EMU would be made when the conditions were found to be favourable.
53 The risks 
of a fixed approach are that the costs of fulfilling Maastricht may unexpectedly become too high, 
especially if cyclical factors turn out to be unfavourable. By the same token, the loss of credibility 
could be rather painful if the country decides to retreat from the commitment given earlier and 
fails to adopt the euro at the pre-announced time. On the other hand, the risks of a flexible 
approach consist in the fact that the intention to adopt the euro may seem to be too loose. The 
approach may lack credibility and may not anchor expectations effectively, especially when it 
comes to dealing with exchange rate expectations.  
6.4 Issues to be Resolved 
The very purpose of using the common currency is to maximise the economic benefits over the 
long run. Presumably, the same principle of maximising the benefits (or alternatively minimising 
the costs) should apply to the very procedure of adopting the euro. Below, we discuss several 
issues that decision-makers are likely to face. These will have to be resolved in order to minimise 
the potential output loss while passing the Maastricht entry test.  
Issue 1: Speed of real appreciation   The first issue to be taken into account is the real 
appreciation of the currency. For monetary policy, the real appreciation is basically an exogenous 
process and policy should not act against it. It has been argued that fast real appreciation might 
lead to difficulties with meeting the Maastricht monetary criteria. In contrast, slow real 
appreciation is supposed to provide more comfort in meeting the criteria, although there is no 
guarantee of “automatic” fulfilment. The speed of real appreciation sets the overall background 
for meeting the Maastricht monetary criteria.  
Issue 2: Relationship between nominal appreciation and inflation   The second issue is the 
above-discussed uncertainty regarding to what extent the relation between nominal appreciation 
and inflation is predetermined exogenously, or rather to what extent this relationship is under the 
“control” of policies. Conversion of real appreciation into nominal appreciation can thus be 
considered a “first line of defence” against the potentially costly fulfilment of the MIC.  
An important question emerges concerning to what extent the level of the CNB inflation target 
will be conducive to meeting the MIC. It should be noted that the future CNB point target is 
defined in terms of annual CPI inflation of 3%. On the other hand, the MIC is defined in terms of 
the HICP. In recent years, Czech inflation expressed in terms of the CPI has been about ¼ of a 
percentage point higher than that expressed in terms of the HICP (see the Appendix, which 
analyses the difference between the CPI and HICP in greater detail) and it is likely that this 
difference will persist over the medium term (until the envisaged harmonisation of price indexes 
is completed). It can be inferred that the CNB’s point target of 3% is slightly above the average 
                                                           
53 From reading the strategy of the Czech Republic towards the euro, one is tempted to conclude that it 
represents an in-between approach. On the one hand it declares that the euro is envisaged to be adopted during 
2009–2010, but on the other hand the eventual adoption of the euro is made conditional on the readiness of the 
adjustment mechanisms to cope with shocks and/or business cycle asynchrony. This dichotomy thus blurs not 
only the timing of the adoption of the euro, but also the way in which the decision will be made.  36   Vít Bárta  
 
level of the MIC of 2.6% (based on the EU-15 during 1999–2004). Higher safety in meeting the 
MIC may thus require a downward adjustment of the inflation target.  
Issue 3: Ready (and willing) to disinflate?   When monetary policy does not have “control” over 
the relationship between nominal appreciation and inflation (and at the same time the real 
appreciation is high) the situation becomes rather awkward. Policy-makers will have to opt either 
for “hard fulfilment” or for “soft fulfilment” through negotiation. With respect to “hard 
fulfilment”, our simulations imply that the feasibility of disinflation increases the earlier the 
desirable level is announced and targeted.
54  
Issue 4: Try to soften the MIC!   Under certain circumstances, the costs of “hard fulfilment” 
may turn out to be “excessively” high and therefore unaffordable. An economy-friendly option 
would then consist in an explicit softening of the MIC. The success of any negotiation towards 
softening is impossible to assess in advance, as the outcome depends on numerous factors. They 
include the envisaged margin of missing the MIC, the overall performance of the given economy, 
its ability to meet the other Maastricht criteria, the performance of other EMU acceding 
economies, the possible existence of new precedents, the overall state of affairs in European 
integration, the general political mood in Europe, etc.
55  
Issue 5: What about cheap fulfilment?   If policy-makers discard “hard fulfilment” and fail to 
re-negotiate the MIC, “cheap fulfilment” may represent one of the last hopes. If it becomes too 
late to implement disinflation policy (without risking excessive costs), or should there be no 
economically justified reasons why the inflation rate should divert from the MIC, such a “safety 
measure” might remain available in the policy-makers’ toolbox. Needless to say, this attitude 
would depart explicitly from the spirit of Maastricht and revert to the letter thereof instead. 
However, this attitude is not unprecedented in the history of European integration, and there are 
basically no effective mechanisms to prevent euro applicants from behaving in such a manner.  
Issue 6: Just postpone it!   The only way of meeting the MIC without incurring unnecessary 
costs while resorting neither to “cheap” nor to “soft” fulfilment, is to postpone the adoption of the 
euro until the unfavourable circumstances possibly change and inflation ultimately meets the test.  
The above discussion is summarised in Figure 12 in terms of a decision-making tree. The tree 
shows the main questions to be asked on the way towards the euro and the implications of “Yes” 
and “No” answers to these questions for the implementation of different policies and kinds of 
fulfilment.  
                                                           
54 From a practical point of view, this would require a modification of the policy decision-making process 
currently applied in the CNB. While the smoothest adjustment of the economy (see the simulations denoted “0”) 
needs 13 quarters to be completed, the standard monetary policy horizon (called the “horizon of most effective 
transmission”) is between 4 and 6 quarters. Based purely on the results of our simulations, the CNB is advised to 
extend its monetary policy horizon.  
55 One could object that it may not be in the interests of the prospective member of the EMU to strive for a 
softening of the MIC and that the application of the criteria in an economically meaningful manner should be 
insisted on instead. As a matter of fact, the difference between “softening” and “application in an economically 
meaningful manner” is quite subtle and formal rather than conceptual. It could be suggested that at the end of the 
day these terms may allow for a comparable scope of tolerance to inflation performance if inflation fails to 
comply with the rigorously computed value of the MIC. The difference thus probably boils down to the 
following: a) while “softening the MIC” is feasible on an ex ante basis, “application of the MIC in an 
economically meaningful manner” seems to invoke an ex post approach;  b) “economically meaningful 
application” sounds more politically correct than “softening the inflation criterion”, which seems to contradict 
explicitly the principle of equal treatment.  Fulfilment of the Maastricht Inflation Criterion by the Czech Republic   37 
 
Figure 12: Decision-making tree: A hypothetical policy questionnaire for a central bank 
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 "soft" fulfilment
Maastrich monetary criteria will be fulfilled
Do you have the relation 
between nominal apprec. 
and inflation under 
"control"?
Postpone adoption of euro 
and wait for a better time
Do you have 
enough time to 
disinflate?
Are you willing to 
incur output 
losses?
Is the expected 
overshooting of 
MIC due to your 
"inappropriate" 
policy?








Is it now 
enough to 
fulfil MIC?
Set inflation target at 
a sufficiently low level
Potential difficulties with fulfiling 
criteria to be expected
Implementation of different 
policies will be necessary
Start answering the following questions:
Meeting the 
Maastricht monetary criteria 
may not be difficult
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6.5 What Does All This Imply?  
Let us integrate the policy discussion with our other findings:  
•  In Sections 2 and 4, we assumed that the MIC (measured by the 12-month moving average of 
the HICP) may be about 2.6%. Actually, it might be even lower. As we saw in Section 5, the 
wider the set of countries is, the lower the MIC tends to be. If based on the EU-25 (excluding 
all negative national rates of inflation) the MIC III average since the inception of the EMU 
until July 2005 is 2.44%.
56  
 
•  Due to the currently used price index statistical methodology, 3% inflation in terms of the CPI 
translates into approximately 2.75% inflation in terms of the HICP (see more in the 
Appendix). This implies that the CNB’s point target may require a downward adjustment to 
better guide inflation towards fulfilment of the MIC. This should increase the likelihood of 
meeting the MIC, other things (such as cyclical factors) being equal.  
 
•  A downward adjustment of the inflation target (for example from 3% CPI to 2.5% CPI) can be 
considered a disinflation shock. As we saw in Section 4, disinflation shocks imply output 
losses. According to our findings, the earlier the disinflation is implemented, the less 
aggressive are the policies required. Our simulations show that 13 quarters are needed to 
achieve the least costly disinflation (in terms of the initial interest rate increase).  
 
•  A downward adjustment of the inflation target is supposed to convert the expected real 
appreciation into nominal appreciation. Nevertheless, the extent of the nominal appreciation 
(see Table 8 in Section 4) consistent with the lower inflation target will not contradict the 
fulfilment of the MERC, due to its asymmetry (see Section 5).  
 
•  Assuming that the euro is adopted in 2010, the MIC reference period is likely to extend from 
the second quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009 (if the assessment by the Council takes 
place in May 2009) or from September 2008 to August 2009 (if the assessment takes place in 
October). This implies that the monetary policy action aiming for “hard fulfilment” would 
need to have started in the first quarter of 2005 (or in the second quarter of 2005). Instead, the 
current horizon of CNB monetary policy is focused on the period from the fourth quarter of 
2006 to the second quarter of 2007. In other words, should the operational and decision-
making framework within the CNB remain unchanged, the “attention” of monetary policy will 
focus on fulfilling the MIC in the fourth quarter of 2006 (or the first quarter of 2007) at the 
earliest. The remaining time span for achieving the desired disinflation will thus be only six 
quarters. According to our simulations, this would require the implementation of rather 
aggressive disinflation policies.  
 
                                                           
56 The level of the MIC may be further lowered due to the enlargement of the EU to include Romania and 
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Based on our analysis, the CNB
57 is advised the following:  
i)  To lower the inflation target to a level which would increase the likelihood of meeting the 
MIC by creating a sufficient “safety margin”. Should, for example, the new inflation target be 
2.5% in terms of the CPI (which translates to about 2.25% in terms of the HICP) and the level 
of the MIC about 2.45% (see above), the “safety margin” would be 0.2 p.p.. We argue that the 
adjustment of the target should indicate the commitment of the Czech Republic to duly 
meeting the MIC.
58 Although the width of the tolerance interval (± 1 p.p.) of the inflation 
target is wide enough to overlap with the expected value of the MIC, neglecting the risk of 
missing the MIC may turn out to be risky.  
 
ii)  To adjust the decision-making process in the CNB by extending its policy horizon. The 
purpose is to avoid the implementation of an unnecessarily aggressive tightening.  
 
iii) To refrain from attempting to achieve “soft fulfilment” ex ante if this possibility proves to be 
unworkable. By setting the inflation target at a level which would provide enough comfort for 
meeting the MIC, the CNB might facilitate “soft fulfilment” on an ex post basis should 
anything “go wrong” unexpectedly during the reference period.  
 
iv) To resort to “cheap fulfilment” shortly before or during the reference period if the policies 
turn out to be insufficiently aggressive and/or too inert to yield the desired results during the 
reference period. Government participation in “cheap fulfilment” is indispensable.  
 
v)  To postpone the adoption of the euro if the above measures fail to reduce inflation to a level 
consistent with the future level of the MIC.
59  
 
                                                           
57 This is conditional on the fact that the Czech Republic intends to adopt the euro in 2010 and that the 
government will adopt policies conducive to meeting the fiscal criteria.  
58 Polish policy-makers seem to be strongly committed to fulfilling the MIC. Although Poland used to record 
higher inflation than the Czech Republic on average, the National Bank of Poland set its inflation target at a 
horizontal level of 2.5% back in 2003.  
59 This option will be feasible about one or two years before the reference period, i.e. so far in advance that it can 
be reasonably well predicted by the inflation forecast. This requires maintaining a flexible approach towards the 
euro and also keeping Czech inflation at a desirable level over a certain period of time. Postponement would be 
even more justified when coping with adverse cyclical factors or dealing with negative shocks which would have 
a higher impact on Czech inflation than on inflation abroad. Although it seems attractive to follow the flexible 
approach (i.e. to be able to decide on adopting the euro according to the given situation) rather than the fixed 
approach, the advantage of the flexible approach may be somewhat illusory. Postponement of the adoption of the 
euro is probably easy when it is still several years away, but it certainly becomes more difficult when the 
reference periods are close or have already started. In any case, the border between a fixed and a flexible 
approach towards the euro is less sharp than a first impression would suggest, being very much dependent on a 
number of additional considerations. 40   Vít Bárta  
 
Conclusion  
We have attempted to show that under certain circumstances the fulfilment of the MIC by the 
Czech Republic may imply some difficulties. These concern a possible mismatch between the 
expected level of the MIC and the likely inflation pattern in the Czech Republic during the 
reference period. The mismatch may be due to level factors, cyclical factors and shocks. The 
purpose of the study is twofold: to simulate the impacts of potential disinflation in terms of output 
loss, and to investigate the policy options available for meeting the MIC requirement in the least 
costly way.  
In the case of level factors, we present evidence suggesting a continuing real appreciation of the 
koruna over the medium to long run. Considering the results of several studies, we make the 
assumption that the real appreciation of the koruna is likely to be about 1.5% during the period 
relevant to examining the nation’s eligibility to adopt the euro. In addition, we assume that the 
future level of the MIC will be 2.6% (in terms of the 12-month moving average of the HICP), 
which is equal to the average level of the MIC over the period 1999–2004 (actually this value may 
be even lower due to the enlarged EU). Supposing the average level of inflation in the EU to be 
2.1% (which equals the value of inflation in the EU-25 during 1999–2004) we formulate three 
disinflation scenarios of 0.5 percentage points, 1.0 p.p. and 1.5 p.p. To assess the costs of these 
disinflations we define the loss function in terms of output loss.  
According to our simulations (carried out using the Quarterly Projection Model applied in the 
CNB for forecasting inflation) a decline in inflation by 0.5 p.p., 1 p.p. and 1.5 p.p. leads to a 
cumulative loss of output reaching about 0.5%, 1% and 1.6% respectively of annual potential 
GDP over a period of 4 years. The costs of disinflation seem to be non-negligible in all the 
simulations, be they in relative or monetary terms.  
Because a change of policy rule does not change the properties of the model, the loss function 
based on the output loss does not enable us to discriminate between simulation experiments 
dealing with a given disinflation shock. To overcome this, a second loss function is introduced. 
This refers to the size of the initial increase in interest rates needed to achieve the new (lower) 
level of inflation.  
We impose several time constraints to see how policies should be adjusted to complete the 
disinflation within 10, 8 and 6 quarters. The introduction of time restrictions is essential for the 
simulation outcomes. They imply that the shorter the time to reach a given lower level of 
inflation, the higher the initial increase in the interest rate and the more aggressive the policy rule 
needed.  
If we adopt the assumption that a one percentage point change in the interest rate above the 
baseline is the highest feasible (and affordable) increase in rates, the scope for monetary action 
shrinks remarkably. Fulfilment of the MIC would be possible only if disinflation by 0.5 p.p. is 
engineered and, at the same time, if we do not need to meet the MIC faster than within 8 quarters. 
Attempts to implement a more aggressive policy increase the risk of undermining macroeconomic 
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In addition to the level factors, we simulated the impacts of several shocks. Their impacts are 
quite dispersed. An exchange rate shock would have the strongest impact on inflation (given the 
shock magnitudes adopted), followed by a food price shock and oil shock. Relatively minor 
impacts stem from a domestic fiscal policy shock and a German GDP growth shock.  
Furthermore, we study the likely application of the MIC and the MERC and the interaction of 
these criteria. Some people argue that relatively fast real appreciation leads inevitably to a trade-
off between them. In their opinion, either policies manage to keep inflation down and the resulting 
nominal appreciation will violate the requirement of exchange rate stability, or the exchange rate 
will be fixed and the real appreciation will drive inflation above the MIC. After discussing the 
wording of the relevant documents and the application practice we conclude that the trade-off is 
only partial: while a higher rate of inflation is unlikely to be tolerated, there is basically no limit to 
a nominal appreciation, especially if it is associated with real convergence over the long run.  
The simulation results obtained and the investigation of the likely application of the Maastricht 
monetary criteria set the stage for a discussion of policy options. Conceptually, we introduce the 
three “kinds” of fulfilment of the MIC. We argue that if there is enough time to implement policy 
and if there is a political willingness to incur output losses, it is feasible to engineer “hard 
fulfilment” of the MIC. However, with a shortage of time and a lack of political willingness, a 
need to opt for “cheap fulfilment” emerges. Along with postponement of the adoption of the euro, 
this remains the only option if the economy is hit by an asymmetric inflation shock or if the MIC 
turns out to be inconsistent with excessively volatile domestic inflation. “Cheap fulfilment” is 
basically achievable only through government action. “Soft fulfilment” ex ante does not seem to 
be an easy option considering the current slight inconsistency between the CNB’s point inflation 
target and the expected value of the MIC. A downward adjustment of the CNB target would 
presumably facilitate “soft fulfilment” on an ex post basis. We visualise the available policy 
options in the simplified form of a decision-making tree.  
Based on the findings obtained from the disinflation simulations and the analysis of the Maastricht 
monetary criteria we suggest that the CNB reconsider its current decision-making framework in 
two ways. Firstly, the CNB is advised to adjust its inflation target downwards sufficiently early 
before the reference period. This adjustment should increase the likelihood of meeting the MIC by 
creating a sufficient “safety margin”. This suggestion is justified by the fact that the 3% inflation 
point target in terms of the CPI translates into about 2.75% inflation in terms of the HICP 
(according to current statistical methodology), which is still slightly above the expected level of 
the MIC (expressed in terms of the HICP). Even full transformation of the real appreciation into 
nominal appreciation should not endanger the fulfilment of the MERC, due to its asymmetry. 
Secondly, the CNB is advised to extend its policy horizon. The currently applied horizon of 4–6 
quarters is justified by the delays between monetary policy actions and their strongest impact on 
inflation. Our simulations show that a horizon of no shorter than 3 years permits minimisation of 
the costs incurred by the potentially necessary disinflation.  
As the success of the Czech Republic in meeting the MIC depends on the ability of policies to 
transform real appreciation into nominal appreciation, further research might concentrate on the 
feasibility of doing this. Particular attention should be focused on the downward flexibility of 
prices and wages in the Czech economy and on identifying areas which may represent the major 
bottlenecks. A better understanding of these bottlenecks should provide insights into the 42   Vít Bárta  
 
assessment of the cost and benefits of having the euro in general and the evaluation of the costs of 
entering the EMU in particular.  
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Appendix 
The Difference between the CPI and the HICP
60  
Whereas the Czech inflation target for the period after 2005 has been defined in terms of the 
annual rate of change of the CPI, the MIC has been defined for the moving 12-month average rate 
of change of the HICP. In this appendix, we investigate the reasons for the difference between the 
CPI and the HICP in the past and we discuss the factors which are likely to determine the 
relationship between the two indexes in the future. Also, we outline the implications of our 
discussion for the fulfilment of the MIC. 
1. Past Development  
Figure A1 portrays the difference between the two indexes during 1997/1–2004/7. It is obvious 
that with the exception of several months (especially in the second half of 2000) the level of the 
CPI was above that of the HICP. While the difference between the two indexes reached about 1 
percentage point in 1998, it moved downwards thereafter and since 2003 the CPI has been above 
the HICP by about 0.2–0.3 percentage points on average.  
Figure A1: Inflation in the Czech Republic in terms of the CPI and HICP during 1997/1–




































































Source: Czech Statistical Office, Eurostat, author’s computations. 
 
                                                           
60 The background information in this Appendix has been kindly provided by Robert Murárik (CNB) and Jiří 
Mrázek (Czech Statistical Office).  46   Vít Bárta  
 
2. Reasons for the Difference between the CPI and the HICP  
 
There are basically three reasons for the discrepancy between the indexes:  
1.  The dominant reason is that the consumer basket used for the computation of the HICP does 
not include so-called “imputed rents” (“hypothetical rents of owners”), unlike the basket used 
for the computation of the CPI.
61 An approximation of the difference between the CPI and the 
HICP can be derived from the given change in “imputed rents” multiplied by the constant 
weight of “imputed rents” in the consumer basket used for the computation of the CPI (which 
is 0.0809). If the rate of growth of “imputed rents” was approximately 3% (to correspond with 
the level of the CNB inflation target) the resulting difference between the CPI and the HICP 
would be 0.24 percentage points.  
 
  The indicators used for the computation of “imputed rents” invite the question about the 
relationship between “imputed rents” and other variables which could be relevant to its 
development. Understandably, regulated rents are among the prime candidates.
62 Figure A2 
compares the evolution of “imputed rents” (“hypothetic rents of owners”) with regulated rents 
and with the reimbursement paid in co-operative apartments.  






















Imputed rents (Hypothetic rents of owners)
Regulated rents
Reimbursement paid in co-operative apartments
 
Source: Czech National Bank.  
                                                           
61 Since January 1996, “imputed rents” have been calculated as the weighted average of items from the group of 
so-called “reimbursement paid in co-operative apartments”. This group of items includes outlays for several 
types of apartments (2-room, 3-room, 4-room, etc.), annuity, outlays for maintenance, payments to janitors, 
outlays for lighting, and repayments for the land below co-operative houses. The individual outlay items in 
housing co-operatives are, for the purposes of computing imputed rents, weighted differently than in the 
consumer basket used for computing the CPI.  
62 The most recent decision by the Czech government (announced in summer 2005) is to increase the maximum 
regulated rents by 9.3% in October 2006 and then by about 9% each July until 2011. Afterwards, the rents will 
be fully determined by the market.  Fulfilment of the Maastricht Inflation Criterion by the Czech Republic   47 
 
The evolution of the above variables shows that changes in regulated rents have a very loose 
relationship, if any, with “imputed rents”. It could be assumed that an increase in regulated 
rents (which are under control of the government) can provide an impetus for the movement 
of “imputed rents”. However, neither the scope nor the timing of the latter is in any way pre-
determined by the former. The apparent coincidence of the movements in the two variables 
observed several times in the past may be attributed to the fact that the price changes in these 
areas usually occur in January and/or July. The pace of regulated rent growth thus seems to be 
a poor guide for the evolution of “imputed rents”.  
 
2.  The second reason for the discrepancy between the two indexes is that the weights of the CPI 
do not include purchases of goods by foreigners, while these purchases are included in the 
weights of the HICP. It should be noted that this reason is quantitatively much less important 
than the first.  
 
3.  The third reason for the difference between the CPI and the HICP concerns the discrepancy 
between the weights of the main groups of items in the CPI as compared to the weights in the 
HICP. Table A1 shows the differences in the weights between the two indexes.  
 
Table A1: Weights of the CPI and the HICP  
CPI HICP difference
constant weights 1999 weights for 2005 CPI - HICP
01 Food and non-alcoholic beverages 197,57 191,00 6,57
02 Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 79,24 104,69 -25,45
03 Clothing and footwear 56,93 55,53 1,40
04 Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuel 236,40 162,49 73,91
05 Furnishings, household equipment and maintenance 67,92 54,03 13,89
06 Health 14,35 20,12 -5,77
07 Transport 101,41 112,66 -11,25
08 Communications 22,54 36,28 -13,74
09 Recreation and culture 95,53 109,47 -13,94
10 Education 4,50 6,43 -1,94
11 Restaurants and hotels 74,15 82,28 -8,13
12 Miscellaneous goods and services 49,46 65,02 -15,56
1000,00 1000,00  
 
Source: Czech Statistical Office, Eurostat, author’s computations. 
 
Whereas the CPI is nowadays (still) based on constant weights derived from 1999 consumption 
patterns, the HICP is based on variable (or “moving”) weights which differ each year. The 
difference between the two indexes has been increasing since 2000 and its maximum will be 
reached in 2006, i.e. in the last year for which the 1999 constant weights of the CPI will be used. 
Once the 2005 weights have been introduced into the new CPI (to be used from 2007 onwards), 
the difference between the two indexes will be reduced and the remaining difference will 
predominantly reflect the effect of imputed rents.  
3. Envisaged Development of the Price Index Methodology 
As indicated above, the CPI and the HICP will have the same weights in 2007 (derived from the 
consumption patterns in 2005). However, like in the past, the HICP weights will start “drifting” 
after 2007 to reflect the evolution of consumption expenditures. On the other hand, the weights of 
the CPI (like in the past) will remain fixed throughout the next five years (over the period 2007–
2011).  48   Vít Bárta  
 
In addition to the effect of weights, the future relationship between the CPI and the HICP will be 
influenced by two envisaged modifications to statistical practices. Firstly, “regulated rents” will 
remain a component of the CPI over the long run. However, the computation methodology will be 
changed. Future computations will be based on the so-called “acquisition approach”, reflecting the 
net acquisition of real estate by households.
63 Secondly, “imputed rents” will also become a 
component of the HICP. But this is unlikely to happen before 2010. Nevertheless, once “imputed 
rents” have been incorporated into the HICP, the difference between the CPI and the HICP is 
expected to become negligible.  
4. Implications for the Fulfilment of the MIC 
Taking monetary policy considerations into account, the above insight into the price index 
methodology can be summarised as follows:  
 
1.  As “imputed rents” are unlikely to become a component of the HICP before the end of the 
decade, the difference between the CPI and the HICP will almost certainly still exist by the 
time the readiness of the Czech Republic to adopt the euro comes to be assessed.  
2.  The difference between the CPI and the HICP may be increased by the fact that the weights of 
the CPI will remain stable over the period 2007–2011 whereas the weights of the HICP will 
vary (as has been the case in recent years). Should the reference period for the MIC stretch 
from 2008 to 2009, the effect of the “drifting” weights of the HICP should be negligible. Even 
if the reference period is postponed until 2012 or so, the quantitative impact will probably be 
very small (no greater than 0.1 or 0.2 percentage points).  
3.  It is currently impossible to predict the impact on the CPI of the modified methodology for 
calculating “imputed rents” derived from the “acquisition approach”.  
 
Assuming that the difference between the CPI and the HICP during the reference period will be 
similar to that observed in recent years, we may suggest that 3% CPI inflation translates 
approximately to 2.75% HICP inflation, other things being equal. Should the MIC be located at 
2.6% during the reference period (see Section 4), the CNB’s point inflation target after 2005 (3% 
in terms of the y-o-y CPI) guides monetary policy slightly above the MIC. Considering the degree 
of uncertainty relating to the fluctuation of inflation (reflected by the ± 1 percentage point width 
of the inflation target band) the CNB target should thus satisfy the MIC with a probability of just 
under 50%.  
Should the adoption of the euro be postponed (well) beyond 2010, the inflation target of 3% in 
terms of the CPI may become (almost) identical to the 3% target expressed in terms of the HICP. 
By that time, “imputed rents” are likely to have been included in the HICP and the HICP is 
therefore expected to increase accordingly (and to merge quantitatively with the CPI). If this takes 
place in all EU countries simultaneously (which is the very purpose of harmonising the price 
indexes) a corresponding increase in the MIC level itself can be expected. While this could have 
important implications for the quantitative definition of the ECB inflation target, such a 
modification of the methodology would not alter the above conclusion (about the approximate 
usefulness of the CNB’s inflation target for meeting the MIC).  
                                                           
63 Within this approach, the acquisition of apartments will be treated differently than the acquisition of houses. 
These types of acquisition will be weighted, but the weights are not known yet. Transfers of existing housing 
stock between households will not be considered net acquisitions. Any role of mortgage instruments in acquiring 
real estate will be disregarded (at the request of the ECB).  CNB RESEARCH AND POLICY NOTES 
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